

PALESTINE AND ISRAEL

IMPROVING CIVIL SOCIETY PEACE BUILDING STRATEGIES,
DESIGN AND IMPACT

Joint Report
Department of Peace Operations - PATRIR
& NOVA



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Introduction:

Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Palestine) have seen one of the most extensive investments in conflict resolution and transformation, nonviolence, 'people-to-people' projects and peace education programs of nearly any region in the world. While many individual projects and activities have contributed to meaningful and important change, the overall impact has been substantially less than that which has been hoped for by peace building organizations and donors involved in this work. The building of the separation wall/fence, the war in Gaza, continuing expansion of settlements and continued violence both within and between Palestine and Israel have all taken place - and indeed escalated and intensified - during this period of 'investment in peace'. Strategic analysis of the Palestine-Israel conflict and evaluation of the strategies and programs designed to address it give clear indications why, and key lessons which need to be learned by anyone – policy-maker, practitioner, political leader or private citizen - who is interested in contributing to a just and lasting peace in Palestine and Israel which will guarantee the legitimate needs and interests of both peoples.

Projects & Evaluation

Over the past 20 years, many programs and projects have included impact evaluation and assessments on a project basis. The majority of these assessments have remained as lessons identified within individual organizations - sometimes limited to a few practitioners, with 'organizational memory' and development severely limited and weak, due to loss of personnel or over-concentration of leadership, knowledge and experience learning in senior staff. Many evaluations have pointed to important achievements of specific projects. Serious evaluations have also often identified areas where program strategies and design could be improved to increase impact and relevance. Overall, *a significant amount of learning has occurred amongst a very narrow range of actors involved in these initiatives* - though these reflections:

1. have often not disseminated out to the broader field;
2. have not been equally learned by organizations involved and have not been systematically integrated into the development of strategy and implementation going forward by donors or organizations and agencies on the ground;
3. have not disseminated out more broadly to related sectors and actors not directly involved in peacebuilding but addressing issues affecting the conflict - such as broader programming and engagements in human rights, development, and support for civil society and political development.

In most cases, lessons *identified* have not transformed into lessons *learned*, and have not had a broad impact on improved strategy, design and implementation. Occasional assessments have brought together broader sectors of actors to evaluate and identify 'lessons learned' on key areas of peacebuilding and nonviolence in Palestine and Israel in order to improve future interventions and program design. These remain notably rare, however, and insufficient for the level of strategic review and evaluation - and possible re-alignment - required, if peacebuilding, nonviolence and conflict transformation initiatives are to have a meaningful impact on the conflict.

Evaluation shows there remains a notable lack of:

1. **Understanding, awareness and systemic evaluation** of the full spectrum of cross-sector and multi-level peace engagements in Israel-Palestine, engagements that would increase and strengthen understanding of the cumulative impact of peace interventions and identify gaps and challenges in approaches;
2. **Linkage** between strategic conflict analysis and program design and intervention - with the majority of programs being based on limited needs, situation assessments or intuitive understanding rather than rooted in comprehensive, strategic, *multi-partial* conflict analysis;
3. **Effective sharing of lessons learned** across civil society, state and non-state actors, and local, national, regional and international stakeholders - to strengthen peacebuilding and efforts to address the conflict(s) and meet the legitimate needs of Palestinians and Israelis for a just and lasting peace.

About the Project and the Methodology

The research component of the "Promoting Human Security in the Middle East: Strengthening the nonviolent alternative" program (funded by the AECID) seeks to build on foundations achieved in earlier work in the Middle East over the past 20 years by numerous actors and take a pioneering step further into key areas essential for helping civil society actors and others involved in peace building and for working with conflict to improve the impact of their programs and activities.

Palestine and Israel: Improving Civil Society Peacebuilding Strategies, Design and Impact was a joint research project implemented in cooperation between NOVA and the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) of PATRIR. It is a *preliminary engagement* that has sought to implement as comprehensively as possible a two-part current situation assessment based upon extensive interviews and stakeholder meetings in Palestine and Israel and a broad review of key literature and analysis.

Methodological Framework:

1. **Strategic Conflict Assessments.** Integrating methodologies drawing upon the work of:

- The Department for International Development (DFID): *Guidance Notes on Strategic Conflict Assessment*;
- The Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network (CPR): *Conflict Profile*;
- Responding to Conflict (RTC): *Working with Conflict Handbook* and conflict mapping methodologies;
- The Clingendael Institute: *Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework*;
- The Department of Peace Operations (DPO): *Conflict Intelligence and Systemic Peacebuilding, Methodologies and Frameworks*.

2. **Program and Impact Evaluation and Assessment.** Integrating methodologies drawing upon the work of:

- Collaborative for Development Action (CDA): *Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) and Cumulative Impact Projects*
- Search for Common Ground: *Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs*;
- Conflict of Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network (CPR): *Peace Profile*;
- The Reflective Peacebuilding Toolkit: *Framework of Peacebuilding Theories of Change*;
- Organization for Cooperation and Economic Development-DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development (OECD-CAD): *Guidelines for Design and Evaluation*;
- Department of Peace Operations (DPO): *Designing Peacebuilding Programs Methodology*.

This report is intended to provide a preliminary 'first step' assessment of three key areas:

1. **Strategic Conflict Assessment:** Assessing key aspects of the conflict, conflict dynamics, actors, sources, pillars, enablers, blockers using an integrated SCA methodology.
2. **Cumulative Impact and Needs Assessment:** Assessing lessons learned and cumulative impact of civil society engagements for peace building in Israel-Palestine.
3. **Strategic Peacebuilding Proposals:** Identifying proposals by key actors involved in dealing with the conflicts in Israel and Palestine and provide recommendations to civil society organizations, donors, national and international actors involved in peacebuilding and nonviolent work in the region to improve the quality and impact of their programs and of their strategic direction.

Part 1:

Strategic Conflict Analysis

On Existing/Current Analyses of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

i. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is one of the most analyzed and reported upon in history. The majority of this analysis is usually highly partisan (analyzing and assessing the conflict/ occupation from pre-conceived positions) or partial/limited (analyzing particular dimensions of the conflict based upon the background, mandate or interests of the individual or agency carrying out the analysis - i.e. economic, humanitarian, settlements, gender, health, public opinion, security from one side's perspective). This has fostered a lack of comprehensive, reliable, multi-partial and multi-dimensional *strategic conflict analysis, which is necessary for practical and effective policies to address the conflict and transform conflict drivers and dynamics.*

ii. Virtually all stakeholders, domestic and international, are acting from partial analysis and limited/partisan perspectives of the conflict. As the analysis guiding policies and practice is partial/limited, so are resulting policies and programs to address the conflict. This leads them to have reduced/limited strategic relevance or coherence for meaningful impact for peacebuilding and transforming the conflict or to contribute to strategies and policies which directly escalate and deepen key conflict dynamics and pillars.

iii. Amongst those working to address the conflict (or particular dimensions of it) there is little shared analysis or common understanding. While this may be contested by a number of practitioners and analysts, who claim that there is broad consensus on the causes of the conflict and agreement on an outcome, comprehensive review of materials, public speeches, publications, and extensive field interviews sustain the assessment that significant and deep differences of analysis remain, while a vision of a mutually acceptable outcome that would meet the legitimate needs and interests of all parties is not widely accepted/known.

iv. Different groups of actors share an understanding of some key issues from the perspectives within their groups. There is often sharp and bitter dispute, however, *between* sectors/groups with different analyses - including labeling those who have different opinions/perspectives as 'traitors' and 'terrorists' or dismissing any opinion contrary to one's own as 'anti-Semitic', 'anti-Israeli', 'pro-Israeli', 'anti-Palestinian', 'anti-peace', etc. Very little analysis identifies *legitimate needs and interests* of different actors in a way that is broadly accepted. While many of the key elements of an outcome are identified *and acceptable to broad portions of both populations*, they have not gained strategic traction or *critical support* to significantly shape the conflict.

v. There remains, therefore, a broad spectrum of 'points of view' and analyses about causes, drivers and 'primary responsibility' for the conflict. While agreement can be found on a number of key issues (i.e. that escalating and expanding settlements are fuelling violence and that militarized/violent strategies by actors on both sides re-enforce conflict dynamics) amongst some actors, the lack of a coherent, shared analysis amongst a critical mass of key stakeholders involved in peacebuilding leads to *fragmented, often contradictory efforts and engagements* which, while sometimes successful at the level of individual

programs, projects, or initiatives, *fail to have cumulative impact* and have little to no significant effect on the conflict/occupation at a strategic level.

vi. A key factor driving this fragmentation is partisan bias or solidarity/identification with one party or another and the absence of multi-partial, comprehensive strategic conflict analysis. This is true both at the strategic geopolitical level guiding major donors and regional and international actors, and at the level of on-the-ground peacebuilding, peacemaking and nonviolent engagements.

On the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Transformation/Resolution

"The conflict over Palestine has settled into a kind of dynamic stalemate. The state of Israel pursues a strategy of escalating brutality against Palestinian civilian society. The dominant forces on the Palestinian side oscillate between attacks on civilians in Israel and concessions to Israeli demands. Each side chooses from a limited and predictable menu of responses which do not alter the underlying balance of forces. The dynamics of this brutal standoff are raising the temperature in each society and bringing internal divisions into play. Glimpses of more promising initiatives can be seen on the ground but they are eclipsed by the military/paramilitary players who set the rhythm and pace of the conflict."

(Morales 2007: 3)

vii. Comprehensive comparative analysis of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict over time shows that the conflict and the occupation fuelling it have significantly worsened in the 16 years since the signing of the Oslo Accords and are continuing to worsen now. The policies and strategic choices which have contributed to this are clearly identifiable:

a. The conflict's underlying/root causes have still not been addressed and there is no reason to believe that the key stakeholders' current strategies will bring any meaningful change in this regard in the coming period;

b. While how the conflict has been waged has been transformed post-Oslo¹, it is still being waged in a largely zero-sum, win/lose, *war culture/war practice* approach. The strategies of the parties in addressing the conflict (particularly those of ongoing occupation and settlement expansion) are largely *re-enforcing and continuing a negative and escalating conflict dynamic*;

c. The impact of the on-going conflict is contributing to further brutalization, traumatization and polarization of the populations on both sides. The Palestinian population is experiencing the brunt of this in the form of on-going, direct, structural and cultural violence, but the impact of violent attacks on the Israeli population and how it affects their view of the conflict and of Palestinians cannot be underestimated. The *visible* and *invisible* impacts and effects of the on-going conflict and occupation (social, economic, political, cultural, and personal/psychological) are significant and are not being sufficiently addressed.

d. There is no widely held view of a fair resolution/transformation of the conflict which has support amongst key actors or the broader population

1. Even this claim can be strongly contested. Expansion of settlements, continuing armed conflict and building of the separation/apartheid wall/ fence have gone on parallel to bouts of negotiation and 'conflict resolution' projects. The former have had a much greater and more direct impact on the lives of citizens, particularly Palestinian, than the latter.

capable of mobilizing and shaping engagement towards it. While many elements of an outcome which would meet the legitimate needs of all parties are clear, the factors and objectives driving major parties in their engagement in the conflict do not support these and there is no coherent, strategic process in place to achieve these.

viii. Therefore: on the four crucial dimensions of transformation of a conflict - 1. Addressing Root Causes; 2. Transforming Attitudes and Behavior and Conflict Engagement Patterns; 3. Addressing the Impact and Effects of the Conflict on Society; 4. Developing a Mutually Acceptable Outcome which addresses the legitimate goals, needs and concerns of all parties involved - the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is continuing to worsen and escalate.

On Conflict Dynamics

ix. The cumulative dynamic and strategic trend of the conflict/occupation over the past 16 years has seen substantial expansion of Israeli occupation - "facts on the ground" - of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), worsening violence and human rights violations, intensifying militarization, demonization and polarization, expanding settlements and road construction, and entrenching policies, conflict attitudes, behaviors and strategies fuelling escalation and intensification.

x. This has happened in the context of significant engagement by a broad spectrum of actors to 'transform the conflict'/build peace in Israel-Palestine, in which many of these activities have had important results, but in which they have not, as a whole, brought about a *strategic transformation of the conflict*. In fact, throughout this period key conflict drivers and escalating strategies were pursued and often enabled, worsening the overall dynamics and situation.

xi. The last 16 years have therefore seen deterioration in relations between Israelis and Palestinians - many of whom will never actually meet as they are kept structurally apart (both a result and a pillar of the conflict). Demonization, anger, hatred, and inimical images have increased and are deeply held and wide-spread amongst large portions of populations on both sides. This ranges from feelings of hopelessness, powerlessness and lack of trust (in 'the other', in prospects for peace, in agencies and actors working to address the conflict) to the belief that 'they've proven they don't want peace' and 'the only language they understand is violence'.

xii. While several polls and public opinion surveys show continuing support/desire for peace amongst majority populations on both sides, these are joined by surveys which show majorities on both sides doubting whether a just/lasting peace is ever possible and strongly doubting the credibility, integrity and seriousness of the 'other' as a partner for peace (on both sides). The belief or acceptance in both populations in the *legitimacy of violence* for 'self-defense' or 'protection' from the other and the right to employ violence as a 'legitimate means' of waging the conflict remains high, combined with demonization of the other for *their* use of violence.

xiii. Civil society, peacebuilding, peacemaking, nonviolent actions and projects, while continuing under often difficult and contrary circumstances, *have largely failed to gain significant traction amongst broader populations on each side or amongst sufficient numbers of political, military, decision and opinion-making leadership to have a clear strategic impact on the conflict.*

xiv. The achievement of many of these initiatives, however, should not be underestimated; it contains potential foundations for serious/coherent efforts to

address the conflict. In many cases, the failure of these initiatives has been a direct result of the strategies, approaches and nature of those engagements and the broader domestic and international nature of peacemaking and peacebuilding in Israel-Palestine. In particular, the lack of any clear overall strategy enabling different specific contributions to compliment and support each other and the often ad-hoc, one-off nature of initiatives and lack of a joined-up approach has reduced effectiveness. International actors' *de facto* support for continuing militarization and arming of actors on both sides (from the occupying Israeli Defense Forces to the security and police forces of the Palestinian Authority), have further solidified and entrenched a military culture and opportunity/context for armed escalation. The fact that this support has dramatically and overwhelmingly exceeded actual funding for peacebuilding and peacemaking initiatives in Israel-Palestine has directly contributed to the current context and dynamics.

xv. Limited impact of peacebuilding and peacemaking initiatives is therefore also a result of the depth and scale of the conflict/occupation and of disproportionate support for conflict escalating policies rather than serious/sustained peacemaking and peacebuilding initiatives beyond token engagements. Failure to develop a coherent and *systematically* supported strategy for peaceful resolution and transformation of the conflict and significant engagements at one level/track not (sufficiently) supported by complimenting engagements at other levels/tracks, has *substantially reduced potential impact of peace engagements*.

xvi. International policies and engagement in Israel-Palestine in the 16 years since the Oslo Accords have largely sustained and enabled this dynamic. Failure of key parties - neighboring Arab States, the USA, the EU, UN, Russia - to develop a shared, consistent and comprehensive engagement supporting a just peace and end to the occupation has combined with support for actions and policies which have escalated and worsened the conflict. External actors have contributed with enabling/facilitating actions and policies directly contradictory to a meaningful peace process - from financial support to settlement expansion, to military support in the form of training, equipment and subsidies, and to biased/partial support for one side or another.

xvii. Those initiatives which have offered some hope of addressing key aspects in the conflict and providing a framework for meaningful progress (such as the Saudi/Arab Peace Initiative or citizens' initiatives such as the Geneva Accords or the Nusseibeh-Ayalon Initiative) have not received the support they would need from key external actors, and have often fallen victim to timed escalations of the occupation/violence which have reduced focus and side-tracked these initiatives.

xviii. In this context - and in conditions of intensified conflict and occupation, entrenchment of expansionary positions, and hardening of public opinion - there is little evidence that the current Obama Presidency engagement or regional, EU and UN initiatives will contribute to any meaningful shift in dynamics or long-term trends on the ground, *unless they are coupled with:*

- Significantly increased coherence and consistency in which external actors would not 'vocally' support peace, but financially, militarily and operationally support expansion of violence and occupation;
- A comprehensive strategy based upon a coherent, multi-partial, multi-sectoral analysis and understanding of the conflict and coherence of engagements across all levels: political, economic, military, diplomatic, and civil society/public engagement;
- Commitment to holding all parties accountable and establishing credible standards and steps to implement a meaningful peace process respecting international law, human rights, key UN Resolutions and the legitimate

interests and needs of all parties for a just peace and an end to military and civilian occupation and encirclement.

xix. There are so far limited/few indications that such an approach is being seriously considered/developed.

Continuing and Escalating Conflict and Occupation

xx. In the absence of a coherent, widely supported strategy rooted in multi-partial analysis and understanding of the conflict addressing legitimate needs of all parties for a lasting, just peace and end to occupation and violence (direct, structural and cultural) the default will be a continuing of the deep structure and dynamics of the conflict, including continuing expansion of 'facts on the grounds', intensification of occupation and 'encirclement', and outbursts of violence - from daily incursions, shootings, and wide-spread human rights violations to missile attacks and moments of escalated war/fighting.

xxi. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by two competing/clashing national movements seeking to establish their rights in the same territory. Significant concessions have been made by the Palestinian movement opening possibilities for resolution of the conflict. These have been met by continuous policies of the past 16 years of expansion and further occupation of territory by Israeli state and (armed) civil actors, further escalating and fuelling violence and blocking any prospects for meaningful peace. In this context, offers of 'economic peace' and 'temporary settlement freezes' have obfuscated the reality - and long-term strategy clearly seen both since and before Oslo - of seizing and establishing 'facts on the ground'. These prevent any possible just resolution, and therefore any possible resolution, of the conflict.

xxii. Heavily biased media largely fails to present comprehensive or balanced analysis of the conflict - or the policies of both sides. A significant number of Israeli citizens believe that Israel has withdrawn from both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and are unaware of (1) continuing expansion of settlements in the West Bank and (2) policies of military encirclement and control of both territories. The majority of Palestinian citizens are also largely unaware - and prefer not to reflect upon - the impact of the conflict and violent/suicide attacks on Israeli society and the psychology and context in which these attacks are received.

xxiii. Though large majorities of Israelis remain generally supportive of the removal of settlements, particularly if it would contribute to supporting a lasting peace and freedom from Palestinian missile attacks, equal or larger majorities support military encirclement, occupation and armed conflict (i.e. Gaza, Southern Lebanon) when presented/framed as *security measures to protect from Palestinian/Arab' violence*. While large majorities of Palestinians support an end to the war and occupation, equal or larger numbers support missile/violent attacks on Israel(is) as *legitimate measures* in the face of occupation and continuing brutalization, humiliation and human rights violations. On both sides, acceptance and legitimization of violence against the other in pursuit of security/end to occupation, contributes to a continuing and escalating cycle and logic of violence.

xxiv. The role of the media and political rhetoric fuels this on all sides. Reporting largely feeds and fuels enemy images, demonization and increasing perception of the other as a 'threat' and the cause of the problem. Media is largely *an escalating and driving factor in the conflict* parroting official lines and harshly condemning deviation. Few media report accurately on the actual experience of

the conflict from a multi-partial perspective. Those that do are often labeled as traitors and harshly condemned. Serious, qualitative, multi-partial analysis and journalism are rare.

xxv. In this context: there is no currently existing active critical or strategic mass for peacebuilding or *serious leadership* for peace. Strategies of major actors on both sides principally escalate or maintain the conflict - through escalation/expansion of occupation and militarization or failure to develop effective strategies to meaningfully transform the dynamics of the conflict/occupation - and offer little in terms of credible strategies/ opportunities for ending the occupation and sustainable peace. Majority populations on both sides, while wanting an end to war and violence, *are not mobilized/active, using constructive and effective strategies, to achieve this goal.*

Tacitus' Paradox

Atque, ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.
(They create a wasteland and call it peace).

- Since the Oslo Accords 'peacebuilding' and 'peacemaking' initiatives have taken place in the context of a continuous escalation and intensification of the root causes and underlying contradictions which have given rise to the conflict. This apparent paradox is expressed in the intensification of settlement expansion, the apparatus of occupation, continuing violence/war (as in the war on Gaza), and deepening polarization at many levels.
- Claims to 'peace' have therefore lost credibility with many actors and populations on both sides. While many projects and initiatives continue at both state and non-state levels (including local, national, regional, and international, and across a broad-spectrum of engagements) *there is a clear absence of any shared/coherent strategy for addressing the conflict and working towards realizing the just and legitimate needs of both populations.*
- Two lessons clearly stand out:
 - i. Any approach which fails to recognize and address the legitimate concerns of both national movements is incongruous and certain to fail;
 - ii. Throughout the period of the last 16 years the primary and major dynamics have seen the continued implementation and *furthering* of conflict escalating strategies. To transform Clausewitz who said that 'war is the continuation of politics by other means' the period of the 'peace process' has witnessed the continuation of war by the same and other means - deepening the conflict and preventing realization of a just and lasting peace.
- Relentless expansion of Israeli-settlements, Israeli-only roads encroaching upon and fragmenting Palestinian territory, daily forced displacement, targeted assassinations, human rights violations, armed incursions in Palestinian towns and villages, road blocks, restrictions, blockades, and encirclement and economic strangulation of the OPT and building of the 'Wall/Fence' have not been an Israeli response to Palestinian violence - suicide and rocket attacks - as they are often presented. Rather, *they are a clear strategy on the part of those shaping Israel's engagement as a state and with key non-state actors for the past 16 years.*
- A "*pre-eminent confidence-shattering measure*", these policies are accompanied with public relations/political statements favoring peace and systematic demonization and blaming of Palestinian leadership and 'terrorists' for failure to achieve that peace. Systematic analysis of Israeli military/state/settler

policy during this period, however, indicates that - contrary to political/ public statements - actual policy has enabled continual expansion and encroachment upon Palestinian land to seize maximum territory, prevent realization of a viable Palestinian state, while presenting 'Palestinians' as the obstacles to peace.

- The use of violence by Palestinian actors within this dynamic provides a legitimizing framework in which Israeli expansion of settlements can continue while identifying 'Palestinian violence' as the obstacle to peace. Palestinian violence, therefore, is a key ingredient *supporting/enabling* continuation of the occupation of Palestine.
- Continuing violence and escalation/deepening of the occupation reduces confidence in 'peace' and in 'the other' for populations on both sides, disempowering the majorities wanting an end to the conflict and occupation, and empowering active support for violence/expansionary policies.

Internal Israeli

The following are extracts of key assessments by Israeli practitioners and analysts interviewed. They do not necessarily reflect the opinions of all those interviewed, but identify important issues relevant when assessing efforts to address the conflict in Israel-Palestine today.

- i. Israelis working in Palestine to oppose continuing settlement expansion or protest against the Wall/Fence are seen by many in Israel as traitors. Israelis working more broadly on settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are often seen as naive. Too little has been done to effectively engage/build bridges with mainstream Israeli thinking and:
 - a. Present peace as a viable outcome which will achieve core Israeli needs for security, protection against any future holocaust/war and realization of legitimate goals and needs - including acceptance as a people;
 - b. Develop an understanding of mutual responsibility and how *Israeli policies* are contributing to/driving the conflict - including what can be done to transform those policies and increase democracy, human rights and security for both Israelis and Palestinians.
- ii. Not enough has been done to build a broad-based consensus and support for *peacebuilding as addressing the legitimate needs and interests of Israeli citizens, to recognize legitimate Palestinian needs*, to make visible the *illegitimacy of war and continuing occupation* or to *humanize Palestinians to Israelis* creating an understanding and responsibility for Israeli actions towards them. Indeed, while many Israelis want peace, many also perceive or identify 'peace' as a possible threat to their future and existence.
- iii. Most Israelis remain unaware of the actual realities and daily experience of occupation from the Palestinian experience. Many Israelis, while supporting peace and an end to occupation, need to have it proved for them that:
 - a. An end to the conflict will result in greater security and core needs and identity being respected, *and will not present a future risk/threat*;
 - b. Real security cannot be achieved as long as Palestine is occupied;

c. The brutality of continuing occupation is creating the context in which violence is perpetuated.

iv. A concerned number amongst Israeli analysts and practitioners believe that Israeli public opinion and political leadership and strategy is shifting continuously to support for/acceptance of increasing militarization of the conflict. This includes a willingness to accept massive human rights violations and military action as a 'security response' to Palestinian attacks. Israelis are told that Israeli measures are a 'response' to Palestinian actions - prior Israeli actions or the context of occupation are not seen/recognized as causal or contributing factors.

v. Israeli peace organizations and peace initiatives are largely *peripheral* and have not managed to significantly *mobilize* sustained and strategic active engagement for peace and political and public opposition to continuing war and occupation. While there are at times large demonstrations for peace and signing of support for peace initiatives, more is required to develop this into *strategic engagement* to end the occupation and transform the conflict. Current developments in this direction are very limited. Instead, it appears that the 'peace camp' is becoming smaller and more marginalized, though the brutality of recent developments and escalation may - in the coming period - cause a swing (temporary or substantial) in the direction of mobilization to end the occupation and war. There appears to be little realistic direction or strategic planning for how to affect this.

vi. While Israeli civil society is vibrant and active, those involved in 'peace' work and peace-related activities are less than 5%. Many Israeli organizations - including those dealing with issues of human rights, social and economic justice, and other related issues - do not address issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

vii. Most Israelis do not see the link between continuing occupation and war and economic and political issues facing Israel. Greater effort is needed to make this link visible, and to raise awareness of how the occupation affects Israeli political and economic life and culture, and its impact on Palestinians.

viii. Many Israeli analysts and practitioners believe that if Israelis could be convinced that Palestinians have the same (human) rights as them, they would not be able to accept the continuing situation of occupation and its impact on Palestinians. Unfortunately *there does not appear to be significant movement towards this*. To develop strategic momentum and direction for a resolution, *broader sectors* of the Israeli public need to be mobilized and engaged by addressing their legitimate needs and concerns and core values and beliefs.

ix. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is presented for many Israelis as a matter of *survival for the State of Israel and the Jewish People (with the State of Israel the homeland of the Jewish people)*. Anything which is seen as a threat to that or which is seen as questioning the rights of Israelis - or which presents Israelis as in any way responsible for the current conflict - is perceived as an attack and is often presented as *anti-Semitic*. The framing of the conflict as one of *survival* and linking with historical legacies of the holocaust and anti-Semitism effectively acts as a block for addressing the conflict today and legitimizes - in the eyes of many Israelis and Jews inside and outside of Israel - Israel's actions in (perceived) 'self-defense'.

x. Israeli media largely maintains and re-enforces official government positions and is playing a primarily polarizing/demonizing role, re-enforcing perceptions and narratives which present Palestinians as a threat, legitimize Israeli actions (including use of violence and armed aggression), and does not help to enable citizens to understand root causes of the conflict from a multi-partial perspective,

develop empathy with Palestinians and their experiences, or contribute to enabling balanced discussion of strategies and options to meet the legitimate needs and interests of both peoples.

xi. With the outbreak of the second Palestinian *Intifada* in 2000, Israeli support for a 'peace' process reached an unprecedented low. Continuing violence and escalation and the war against Gaza have deepened this. Many Israelis believe that the Israeli government 'offered Palestinians the best deal they could get' and that the Palestinians refused it. The Israeli narrative of the conflict is of Israel making efforts for peace and Palestinians refusing. Few Israelis are aware of the actual policies or actions of the Israeli government on the ground in the OPT or the track record of the military conflict and armed attacks on *both sides* leading up to the second Intifada.

xii. The narrative of 'betrayal' and Palestinian *unwillingness* to take steps for peace re-enforces the image of Israelis as the aggrieved party doing their best to bring about peace in a context where the other party is unable/unwilling to. When acts of violence by Palestinian groups are added to this, this extends to legitimization of and support for Israeli 'response' in self-defense and 'as the only remaining option' after peace has been refused.

xiii. Anti-Palestinian/Anti-Arab discourse and sentiment is wide-spread. While it is common to say "I am not against them" or "I am not a racist" (many Israeli's will point to willingness to accept Palestinian rights and independence "if only Palestinians themselves would be willing to accept peace"), analyses of Israeli politics, laws and public opinion show deep strains of racism/discrimination - in many cases bred by fear and perceived threat - against Palestinians/Arabs, including highly developed enemy images and perceptions of the other as irrational, violent, and intrinsically 'less than' civilized/peaceful/ democratic. Any use of violence by Palestinian groups - whatever the context, motivation, strategy or reasoning - or political rhetoric seen as condemning the 'state of Israel' or 'Jews' is perceived within this framework and serves to legitimize/strengthen Israeli occupation and use of violence against Palestinians, thus (re)enforcing continuing war and occupation.

Internal Palestinian

The following are extracts of key assessments by Palestinian practitioners and analysts interviewed. They do not necessarily reflect the opinions of all those interviewed, but identify important issues relevant when assessing efforts to address the conflict in Israel-Palestine today.

"Mobilizing, unifying and energizing the entire population inside Palestine and beyond will be the central task for Palestinian strategists contemplating a reorientation of strategic priorities."

(Palestine Strategy Study Group 2008: 45)

"One of the most important things we need to do now is to rehabilitate the Palestinian national movement."

(Palestinian analysts and grassroots workers 2008)

i. The Palestinian population is deeply fragmented. The impact of the occupation, encirclement, territorial divisions of Palestine by the wall, settlements and road construction, the war on Gaza, economic development, and struggles for power within Palestine between different factions, have resulted in multiple, deep fragmentations of Palestinian society - geographic/territorial, ideological, religious, economic, social, generational, political.

ii. Combined with *i*, the impact of Israeli occupation and war strategy and the lack of any clear, coherent, shared strategy for how to address the ongoing conflict and occupation by Palestinians, this has brought about an internal crisis within Palestine and a nadir in efforts to address the conflict and build a viable independent state.

iii. While Palestinian NGOs are seen to have played a significant role in the first *Intifada*, many are perceived as working to benefit themselves and benefitting from their partnership with Israeli or foreign donors. There are high levels of suspicion and mistrust both amongst and between many NGOs, particularly those advocating peacebuilding or working together with Israelis for peace and from the Palestinian population towards NGOs. Many Palestinian NGOs are doing superb work and there is significant dedication, expertise and commitment amongst them. At the same time, reliance on foreign donors and the high number of organizations also reflects a tendency towards fragmentation and disunity of efforts, rather than coherence and mobilization of capabilities.

iv. There is currently: no united leadership; both vertical and horizontal division within Palestinian society; a multiplicity of strategies and approaches with little coherence or cohesion between them. Actors are pursuing their own approaches and often strongly different strategies, fragmenting capacities and often contradicting each other's initiatives. Without a united leadership and common strategy with a clear agenda and ethical program, the Palestinian people are unable to effectively mobilize the full potential of human, social and political resources inside Palestine. This also affects their ability to mobilize *sufficient/strategic* support internationally (both political and popular).

v. The on-going armed conflict, multi-decade experience of violence, and history of the Oslo/Post-Oslo support for building up the Palestinian Authority's Security Apparatus (by foreign states and donors, Israel and the PA), and external and internal support for armed movements in Palestine has led to a profusion of violence and re-enforced political authoritarianism in Palestine. As in Israel, this has led to the development of an increasingly militarized, security-oriented state. While Israeli-state militarism is often directed against Palestinians (in the OPT and at times against Palestinian/Arab Israelis), Palestinian state and non-state militarism is directed against its own population and competing forces within Palestine, and at times against settlers and Israeli military and population.

vi. Use of violence by members and parties aligned with Hamas and Fatah has led to further breakdown within Palestine. At times over the past 20 years more Palestinians have been killed by intra-Palestinian violence than by Israeli occupation forces and settlers. This weakens Palestinian efforts for national freedom and supports the occupation. Divisions between Hamas and Fatah permeate governance institutions, civil society, media and communities. National institutions of the Palestinians as a people have been significantly damaged/destroyed both by internal divisions and by Israeli assaults, encirclement and closures and the war on Gaza.

vii. The Palestinian Authority is seen alternatively as:

- a. A vehicle for national liberation/transformation/self-determination;
- b. A 'police man' for Israel;
- c. A distributor of jobs/opportunities/wealth/patronage for supporters and punishment for opponents;
- d. A service provider for the population.

iii. Ongoing violence from the occupation and war, combined with repression by

the PA of opponents (including nonviolent, civil society and human rights activists) has contributed to the sense of resignation, hopelessness and disempowerment amongst many sections of the Palestinian population. Overall there has been a significant weakening of politicization amongst many sections of the Palestinian public which has become disillusioned with the promises of 'peace' and the Oslo process, internal fighting, perceived corruption amongst state and NGO sectors, economic downturn, and lack of confidence in the prospect/hope for peace, security, human rights and freedom.

ix. Israeli economic policies, policies of closures and reduction of the use of Palestinian labor in the Israeli economy after the first Intifada have contributed to the *substantial de-development of the Palestinian economy* in the past 16 years. This has led to increased unemployment, reduced income, and economic privation. While a very few have done well - including many in the Palestinian state and security apparatus and some in the private sector - the majority of Palestinians have faced significant economic hardship. Conditions in Gaza have reached extreme proportions. Recent economic 'growth' in the West Bank needs to be placed against the long-term systematic destruction of the Palestinian economy over the past 16 years. The Palestinian Authority and the people/population more broadly (including also business interests and labor/civil society) have not been able to develop/implement any effective policy for development or mobilization of national resources for economic well-being. Even given the Occupation, mobilization for national development, while extremely difficult, could strengthen efforts for ending the occupation and authentic peacebuilding. The donor community has similarly *not developed any coherent/consistent strategy* to support meaningful economic development in Palestine and has de facto acquiesced to Israel's economic and security policies of *development of Palestine and structured dependence* using Palestine as a market for Israeli goods and source of limited cheap labor.

x. Continuing/near relentless *de facto* expansion of Israeli settlements and the architecture of occupation from 'Oslo' to today, combined with daily/weekly military incursions into many Palestinian villages, forced separation of the West Bank and Gaza, enclosure of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, building of the Wall/Fence, continual attacks by settlers and the Israeli military, and the recent war on Gaza, together with hard-line/militant statements by many in the Israeli political establishment, security and media convince many Palestinians that there are no 'partners' for peace on the Israeli side. Continuation of these policies by Israel and support for many of them by Israeli citizens convinces many Palestinians that Israel will only be satisfied with their complete removal from Palestine or the destruction of any real possibility for independence and self-determination for Palestinians.

xi. Many Palestinian analysts and activists/practitioners are calling for a strategic review of Palestinian strategy and experiences of the past 25 years and development of a broad national *freedom/independence movement* guided by a clear ethical agenda through sustained, principled and strategic nonviolence.

Major blockers of the conflict

The following blockers were identified by interviewees:

PALESTINE

- lack of unified leadership;
- lack of clear strategy;
- lack of effective 'national' organization linking different levels of the struggle;

- ideologies promoting/legitimizing violence and demonizing the other;
- corruption;
- increasing and deep internal division and fragmentation between Gaza and West Bank and Hamas, Fatah and other parties;
- people's frustration/tiredness with struggle and 'promises' of improvements;
- lack of building a national liberation movement in capacities, skills, ideology;
- physical fragmentation of Palestine by the occupation;
- arrests, reprisals, killings, and severe punishment of major activists for a movement (both by Pal. 'leadership' and by Israeli occupation);
- deep fragmentation: cultural, territorial, social, economic, etc.
- negotiations of peace agreement itself as a blocker: people lack trust/confidence in the process and in the actors doing it;
- people's tiredness, frustration with 'peace' as a promise they do not see;
- lack of definition of what is normalization and what is authentic work to address the conflict: becomes used as a tool to destroy programs/ people/activities rather than to clearly distinguish between work that can legitimately contribute to change and work that may re-enforce occupation;
- lack of economic self-development and the 'structure' of economic dependency.

ISRAEL

- some of the same as above;
- fear of the other and fear of destruction of Israel/Jewish people (constantly promoted within the society and social and political messages and education)
- myopia: not seeing/recognizing or understanding own responsibility, contributing role and impact of own engagement: that the occupation and conditions enforced on Palestinians are fuelling the resistance;
- lack of immediate impact on most people's daily lives: people don't directly experience the conflict as immediately in their daily lives and so therefore don't feel an imminent 'need for peace';
- strong education of 'defense' of Israel and 'threat' of the other;
- lack of belief in peace: everyone wants it, none believe it's possible;
- no consciousness that anything they had done could be wrong/unjust (not just a question of 'impunity', they don't feel there's anything they need impunity for);
- legitimization in discourse of national preservation and self-defense combined with sense of being 'most just', 'most right', 'most democratic', 'most civilized' army/nation in the world/in history and 'evilness' and threat of the other ('you don't know what it's like' living with them/being surrounded by them);
- actors proactively working to build Yeret Israel and taking Palestinian land.

INTERNATIONAL

- absence of authentic, clear strategy for peace which addresses core, legitimate needs of both peoples;
- often deeply partisan/biased engagement, formally or informally;
- extensive and continuing support for militarization including weapons sales and military/security training;
- lack of coherence and effective coordination in engagement or sustained follow-

through.

Assessment of Peacemaking and Peacebuilding Processes

"At the outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000, the shift from peacemaking to war and conflict was even more abrupt. With the high numbers of casualties on the Palestinian side from the very early days of the uprising, many Palestinians involved in joint activities expected to see their Israeli counterparts taking to the street and rally against those in the Israeli establishment who were drumming up public support against the Palestinians and their leadership. The anger that took hold in Palestinian society immediately created an almost total loss of any legitimacy to talking or working with Israelis. Likewise in Israel, a strong sense of betrayal took hold of many Israelis, even those involved in joint activities, thinking that Palestinians had rejected Israel's "generous" offers for peace and then responded with attacks and violence. With the emergence of two completely different narratives for the breakdown of the peace process, not only did communication cease at the upper political levels, but for many of those Israelis and Palestinians involved in joint activities communication also abruptly ended."

(Dajani and Baskin 2006:96)

"Essentially, one must become attuned to the fact that the peace process failed to solve any of the major, or even the minor, problems that fundamentally define the conflict."

(Hassassian 2006:50)

In order to understand how the situation in Israel-Palestine has deteriorated to where it is today it is important to identify the key fundamentals of the peace process over the past 16 years. The following are assessments by Israeli and Palestinian practitioners and analysts of official peacemaking engagements from the Oslo process to today.

i. When the peace process began, Israelis and Palestinians expected it to bring practical benefits and real changes. Palestinians expected the occupation would end and settlements would be deconstructed, and there would be no more killings or Israeli army incursions. The end result would be an independent Palestinian state. Israelis expected an end to suicide attacks and bombings, acceptance and the opportunity to live in peace. Instead, violence has escalated, the occupation has intensified and the situation today is seen by many as the worst it's been in nearly 40 years.

ii. Peacemaking in Israel-Palestine has rested upon fundamentally flawed foundations. Indeed, on evaluation it is hard to speak of meaningful peace process.

- a. Root causes, violence and conflict escalation have continued largely unabated;
- b. A vision of an outcome *broadly held, mutually accepted and supported and enabled* by the strategies and actions of both domestic and international actors has remained absent;
- c. A *process* which could authentically engage all key actors, solidify and build upon achievements, hold parties accountable to clear objectives and milestones, and enable the painstaking, necessary changes and transformations in parties relations -overcoming demonization, strengthening and enabling mutual respect, creating relations based upon shared recognition of human dignity, human rights, legitimate needs - has

not evolved;

d. The necessary conditions for peace have not been created.

iii. Dynamics of this period have by and large witnessed an expansion of occupation and continuation of armed conflict. Central to this has been the inability to address, prevent or stop conflict escalating actions and strategies. International engagement has been erratic, inconsistent, and clearly biased. Expansion of settlements with land seizures and extension of the occupation - a fundamental root cause of the conflict - can be seen as the enactment of an *overarching defining strategy*, continued unabated and *intensifying* throughout the process. *Facts on the ground* - checkpoints, settlements, roads, the wall/fence - have worsened conditions for Palestinians in the occupied territories. Initial euphoria which greeted the agreement - for many - has given way to a sense of pessimism and betrayal. Escalation of violence throughout this period has led to strong blaming of 'the other' by both sides - seeing their actions as the causes of the failure of the process.

"The perception quickly grew that the peace process was nothing more than something that legitimized the Israeli occupation, Palestinian Authority corruption, and self-aggrandizement after political marginalization, and ultimately Israel's securing control over fundamental Palestinian rights, resources and properties."

(Hassassian 2006: 83)

"...ongoing deadlock in the political negotiations (along with the frequent Palestinian terror attacks against civilians both inside and outside the Green Line - the internationally recognized pre-1967 border between Israel and Jordan), which was not broken after the elections, disillusioned most Israeli Jews about the Oslo process and Palestinians well before the process was declared dead by the decision makers. Nevertheless, this erosion was clearly accelerated after Camp David, as Israel adopted the formal position - eagerly embraced by the public - that the negotiations had failed because Arafat had rejected Baraks' highly conciliatory offer and refused to announce, in return, the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict."

(Herman 2006: 43)

iv. The *logic* of the agreements (the Oslo Accords) delayed dealing with core issues underlying the conflict. The reasoning was that a gradual approach would slowly build the confidence and mutual acceptability of both parties - strengthening trust and patterns of cooperation, and enabling the future resolution of outstanding issues. The problem was that a process necessary to achieve this, and the authentic commitment of both parties to a peaceful outcome which would meet the needs and interests of Israelis and Palestinians, was lacking. Practice saw intensification of occupation of Palestinian land. Increasing violence on both sides contributed to reduced confidence and trust.

v. The *practice* of the period between 1993 and 2000 saw the establishment of numerous state(/institution)-building and security measures and a range of mainly civil society peacebuilding initiatives, within a broader context of worsening standards of living for the Palestinian population, increasing restrictions on movement, expansion of settlements and road building. For this reason, many people have spoken of the Oslo process as a 'state-building process continuing in a situation of occupation'. These were not the results of the failure of the peace process, but the fundamental context and policies which directly contradicted the promise of peace. Military interventions by the Israeli forces and armed violence on both sides - manifestations of the conflict in the context of continuing occupation - contributed to a spiral of continuing escalation,

militarization and polarization.

vi. Throughout this period, there was very little understanding of how *the other* experienced and perceived the process and developments on the ground. Opportunities for systematic interaction and getting to know the other - after a long history of division and conflict - were limited and largely small-scale. Transcendent political leadership able to authentically engage the other and build a context of mutual respect and cooperation was absent. Social engagement for transforming the conflict was sporadic and unstrategic.

vii. Palestinian popular and political understanding of the impact of suicide bombings on Israelis - which increased as settlement expansion and targeted assassination by Israeli forces escalated - was limited. While there was general revulsion/opposition to the tactics used, there were not consistent efforts to bring an end to violence. Enforcement of security measures and repression served to increase fragmentation and divisions within Palestine. At the same time, most Israelis - while nominally supporting peace - were largely unaware of the continual expansion of settlements and intensification of a system of control and occupation through official government actions and measures. Having learned from the first Intifada and systematically studying experiences in liberation and counter-insurgency and small scale war fighting, Israel developed an extensive political, economic and military apparatus and measures for extending control over Palestinian territories, combined with an effective public relations campaign to present Palestinians as the major obstacle to peace. The majority of Israeli citizens believed their country was making significant steps and concessions for peace, only to be met with Palestinian intransigence.

viii. Analysts identified several core challenges built into the Israeli-Palestinian Process:

1. Fundamental recognition and acceptance of the legitimate needs and rights of both communities was never broadly developed/sustained. While this could have been the basis of an agreement and process to transform the conflict, the necessary *strategic commitment* and leadership for this was not forthcoming.

2. Addressing the 'roots' and underlying structures of the conflict was delayed to a later stage creating a lack of a shared/agreed destination in the process. Palestinian concessions were made at the beginning of the process, including acceptance of a Palestinian state in the pre-1967 borders. Israeli concessions were expected to come later, and in the end did not materialize.

3. Peace was divorced from justice and international law. A framework for peace based upon meeting the legitimate needs of both parties and founded in human rights and freedoms for both Israelis and Palestinians was not developed. Instead, 'peace' became the exercise of power by one over the other.

4. Processes to improve relations between the two communities - through people to people exchanges and joint programs - did not address the basic dynamics and logic of the conflict or the continuing expansion of settlements, and were too small scale to have significant impact. These were seen by many as a "Normalization Process" which tried to give the impression of normalcy without addressing basic injustice (oppression) and how to get rid of it. Treating sides as 'equal parties' and ignoring the context of occupation created an imbalanced context and misrepresentation of the conflict.

5. "Palestinians" were defined as only those Palestinians living in the 'occupied territories'. This ignored the situation of refugees and

Palestinians inside Israel. While the issues of refugee Palestinians and Palestinians/Arabs living in Israel are difficult to address, they are core issues and must be resolved fairly for any meaningful resolution.

6. The failure of the Palestinian project - political, economic and social - throughout this period was distinct. There was a lack of vision and a lack of mobilization of the full capacities of the Palestinian people to wage a *constructive* engagement for their rights and independence, which could have built upon the shared desire for peace amongst the majority of Israelis. The building of a 'Palestinian state' under occupation was prioritized over the establishment of authentic independence - whereas in reality both would be needed. Thus the 'state' under occupation became more a system of internal control and distribution of patronage than a vehicle for Palestinian self-determination and freedom.

7. At all levels there was a lack of a clear, well-developed, appropriate - multi-level and multi-sectoral - systematically implemented strategy for peacebuilding and addressing outstanding root causes and conflict drivers.

8. While there have been extensive reviews and analysis of aspects of the peacemaking engagements, there has been no systematic strategic evaluation of the peace process as a whole or evaluation of key gaps, challenges, and identification of clear strategies for how to overcome them.

9. There was no strategic linking and coordination between peacebuilding initiatives at different tracks.

10. Honest criticism/discussion of the peace process and identifying of gaps and challenges was seen as negative or threatening and largely discouraged, suppressed or marginalized.

Part 2:

Strategy

This section provides:

- a. definitions and brief reflections on *strategy*;
- b. a note on strategic effectiveness.

This serves as a prologue in the report to the evaluation of peacebuilding and non-violent engagements to address the conflict and continuing occupation in Israel-Palestine. To some it may seem out of place in an evaluation of civil society efforts to address the conflict - evaluations which normally focus upon 'activities', 'outputs' and 'outcomes'. While the term 'strategy' has made its way into the lexicon of NGOs and donors, terms such as *grand strategy*, *operations*, *engagements*, *tactics* and *means* may seem anathema. They provide, however, an important *strategic* framework for thinking about and understanding *action to effect* change which may identify or address elements frequently missing or underdeveloped in the work of peacebuilding and nonviolent engagements. They also lead us to question the link between the *outputs* and *outcomes* of our projects and activities - which often may involve or affect change at the individual-personal level (and bringing about the broader social, economic, political transformation) and transformation of relations between Israelis and Palestinians at the broad group, social level. It is this *social-economic-political* transformation which is the aim of peacebuilding and nonviolence: to impact the conflict and bring about its transformation, and an end to the occupation. Looking at *vision* and values can help us question and reflect upon what *we are actually trying to achieve* and how we go about doing it. *Strategic effectiveness*, strategic failure and impact are key issues which any individual, organization, donor, government or movement trying to enable and effect change has to address.

This section is not only intended for civil society organizations and those engaged in the full spectrum of peacebuilding, peacemaking, conflict transformation and nonviolence activities, but also for all stakeholders and actors - local, national, regional and international - involved in the Palestine-Israel conflict, including: citizens, activists, community workers, community and social leaders, analysts, media, academics, combatants, civil servants, political leadership and decision-makers, states (regionally and internationally), inter-governmental, non-governmental organizations and donors.

The reason for its inclusion in the report is three-fold, based upon three key findings of the stakeholder consultations:

1. There is a clear and compelling need for a systematic review, analysis and drawing of lessons learned from *past strategies* and approaches that have been used by conflict parties to address the conflict in Palestine-Israel²: to learn where there have been successes and failures and based

² The recent Palestine Strategy Group, *Regaining the Initiative: Palestinian Strategic Option to end Israeli Occupation* (2008) represents an important initiative to bring forward clear strategic thinking and development of strategic options for Palestinians. Its fundamental weakness, however, is that it is almost completely devoid of strategy. Its principle argument is that Israel must accept Palestinian rights and a fair/just resolution of the conflict or it will disrupt Israel's efforts. It lacks, however, any clear strategy of how Palestinians can effectively achieve their

upon the fact that strategies used to-date have on the whole not contributed to a meaningful/significant change for the better in Palestine-Israel. This includes the strategies of the principal conflict parties, as well as of international actors, donors, inter-governmental organizations, and citizens and non-state groups.

2. There is currently a *clear and significant strategic deficit* regarding capabilities for and use of effective *strategic thinking, strategic development* and *strategic planning* for peace-building in Palestine-Israel. This includes amongst key donors and major international actors, a broad range of civil society actors, peacebuilding and nonviolence groups and organizations and the state-parties/leadership on both/all sides. This affects *their* effectiveness, impact and capabilities to work for *strategic change*.

3. Central/principal strategies currently being used by several stakeholders and actors in the conflict - including armed groups, the Israeli state, political factions, and a number of international governments and donors - are *re-enforcing* the fundamental logic and root causes of the conflict rather than enabling their transformation - strengthening/deepening the occupation and war/violence rather than overcoming them.

Strategies can be both *implicit* and *explicit*. An implicit strategy is one which is not consciously reflected upon or recognized by those using it. Instead, it is the result of the basic guiding thinking resting upon assumptions, beliefs about what works and what doesn't, and how the actor or actors perceive the world around them and their engagement in it to effect the change they want or to achieve their desired goal. *Explicit* strategies are consciously formulated as the *thinking* and *plan* of how the party intends to achieve their objective - including utilization and engagement of available means and methods, operations, and interactions with the 'other' and all factors shaping the context and situation which affect realization and achievement of their goal.

Selection of strategy - by an organization, a movement, a people - requires understanding the strategic options available and making a conscious choice based upon analysis of the available information and assessment of all relevant factors (including internal capacity, external environment, values, vision, impact on own community, impact on others, impact on supporters). Choosing a correct strategy which shows a deep understanding for the needs, contexts, and *how* to bring about change under difficult conditions is essential for effective peacebuilding and nonviolence.

Strategy: the planning of the use of available means to achieve a desired objective.

Understanding strategy is key to:

1. Understanding how actors/stakeholders engage in the conflict;
2. Understanding how to effect desired change in the conflict situation.

Peacebuilding and *conflict transformation* strategies in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should contribute to transforming, addressing and overcoming the conflict in a way that meets the legitimate needs and interests of all the actors and parties involved, and enables a *sustainable outcome* in which all parties feel their needs are met, and their identities, rights and dignity are respected and safe. It should also include both *commitment* and *capability* to deal with future

rights/freedom and an end to the occupation: the key strategic issue which needs to be addressed.

conflicts that develop in constructive, effective and peaceful ways. Unfortunately, strategies in the Israel-Palestine conflict often contribute to re-enforcing or escalating the conflict and the logic of violence/war which defines it. Rather than enabling actors to achieve their long-term goals, strategies and means used actually become part of the re-enforcing dynamic and logic of the conflict - keeping it in place and blocking the achievement of their goals rather than enabling it.

Several actors are also acting in a *strategic void*: acting within a given set of assumptions or *reacting* to a situation - this can also include planning and operations on a 'project' or 'activity' level - while not seeing how to link their *actions* and *activities* with achieving the long-term goal and impact they wish to have on the situation. Individuals and organizations in this context may themselves be acutely aware of the lack of strategic impact and effective *strategic planning* and *operations* within their work, but not see how to overcome it. They may also be affected by aspects of their environment - donor regulations, the need for 'activity' based planning, fragmentation/segmentation between different actors and social/community groups, and difficulties placed on movement, organization and action. While these may act as *blocks* to *strategic planning* and action, they are also part of the environment which any strategy in Palestine-Israel needs to take into account and see how to address/transform.

Working Definitions

Strategy: The science and art of employing the political, social, cultural, economic, psychological, human and physical resources of a community, organization or country to achieve desired goals/policies. A careful plan or method which includes a long-range view. The preparation of resources and planning for the use of those resources before, during and after an action. The broad, comprehensive harmonizing of the necessary steps and actions required to achieve a goal. The plan or general scheme of how to conduct a campaign.

Grand Strategy: Strategy +. The weaving together of *strategy* across the entire breadth of a country or community's capabilities to effect change and achieve a goal. The art of employing all the resources of a country/community - across all sectors - to achieve a strategic objective. Grand Strategy encompasses the full spectrum of political, economic, cultural, social, psychological, human and physical resources of a community. It identifies and plans the role each can make in contributing to achieving the goal, and how to enable effective linking-up, coordination and implementation of the full spectrum of the community's capabilities and resources to achieve the object. It encompasses coordination of all state policy - including economic and diplomatic tools and the functions of different ministries/departments - and the different sectors of the society: education, media, business, social, cultural, labor, urban, rural, etc.

Operations: The implementation of coordinated series of actions and engagements in the conflict - in a specific area or field - to achieve strategic objectives. *Operations* can be at both the 'theatre' and the 'tactical' levels. At the 'theatre' level it encompasses several engagements and actions within an area to achieve a specific purpose. At the 'tactical' level it is a specific engagement to achieve strategic or operational objectives.

Engagements: The actual activities and actions through which parties work to achieve tactical or strategic goals.

Tactics: Tactics are the art and skill of employing available means to accomplish an end in a specific operation or engagement. Tactics are concerned with the *conduct* of an engagement - how to do it - while strategy is concerned with how

the different engagements and operations are linked to achieve the overall goal. Tactics may include actions taken in preparation for an engagement, during an engagement, and how to recover or follow-up afterwards. They are *done* by human beings who experience hope, fear, exhilaration, anger, fatigue, doubt, pain and a multitude of other emotions. Human beings are at the centre of tactics, engagements and operations. For this reason, *psychological* as well as physical aspects are important.

Means: The methods used to achieve goals. They can be at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Means which directly contradict the goals and objectives the party is trying to achieve will often be counter-productive and contribute to strategic failure or inability to effectively impact and achieve the desired goal.

Vision: The type of world people want to live in and the change they want to achieve. It encompasses the broad - future - goal that *strategy* is meant to realize/to achieve.

Values: What is central and important to a community, what they believe in, what underlies how they see the world and what they put 'value' in.

Strategic Effectiveness: The ability of a strategy to achieve a desired goal and bring about the desired change.

Strategic Failure or Bankruptcy: The consistent, repeated - often fundamental or systemic - failure or inability of a strategy to actually realize or contribute to achieving the desired goal. Often 'strategies' based upon assumptions, prejudices and ideological framings which may simply perpetuate the conflict or situation. Failed strategies which continue to guide parties actions may themselves be pillars of the conflict.

Impact: The effecting of change on a context/situation/conflict. It is important to draw a distinction between impact at the level of individuals, activities, engagements and *strategic impact* - impact which actually contributes to bringing about meaningful/significant change in the conflict and towards achieving desired goals.

Strategic Effectiveness

A key criterion for evaluating *strategies* - and operations, engagements, tactics, and means - is: *has it contributed to achieving the goal/change* it was designed to bring about. Peacebuilding and nonviolence are about working to transform the conflict - including its root causes - and bringing about a *just* and *sustainable peace* that meets the needs and interest of both/all parties. Operational/project impact needs to translate into *strategic impact* on the conflict. Change at the individual-interpersonal level into social-economic-political transformation. The distinction between *operational/project level* effectiveness and *strategic effectiveness/impact* is essential. Individual projects *should* add up to an overall cumulative strategic effect. In practice *they have not*. This can be due to many factors including: lack of coherence, lack of coordination, lack of cooperation, poorly planned or implemented activities or well planned and implemented activities that are not linked or sustained with efforts elsewhere, and activities and programs which do not adequately address real needs, real issues, real challenges in the conflict or enable the development of sustainable capacities and engagements for peacebuilding. Improving *peacebuilding* and *nonviolence* efforts - to improve their capability to bring about actual change in the conflict and to contribute to enabling real *peace building* and ending the occupation and war/violence - requires:

1. *Strengthening/Improving Interventions*: Improving effectiveness, capability and impact at the level of individual and sectoral engagements - the actual projects, actions, engagements being done (by improving training, quality, practice, effectiveness - drawing lessons learned from past experiences and seeing how to make *each individual* engagement and work at each level/sector more effective); and

2. *Strengthening Systemic Peacebuilding*: Improving strategic coherence and cumulative impact.

The following criteria for strategic effectiveness have been developed by the Department of Peace Operations based upon consultations in Palestine-Israel and work in 16 violent conflict affected-areas world-wide. They can be used to evaluate interventions and the full spectrum of engagements to address a conflict.

Transforming the conflict

Does the action contribute to transforming key attitudes, behaviors, contradictions driving/shaping the conflict?

Preventing/ Stopping Violence	Does the action contribute to preventing/addressing/ stopping violence: direct, structural and cultural?
Addressing Root Causes/Issues	Does the effort effectively address/resolve key driving issues and underlying root causes of the conflict? This includes addressing conflict causes/sources and pillars.
Individual Change	Does the effort contribute to bringing about individual change - change of attitudes, behavior, skills, capabilities - which brings about an actual change in how individual(s) engage(s) in the conflict?
Institutional Change	Does the effort contribute to building the capacity of social and state institutions to actively transform the conflict, challenge/overcome conflict drivers, mobilize and support nonviolence and peacebuilding and catalyze/support/ enable their engagement to do so?
Social Change	Does the effort develop/catalyze/enable/support critical mass, strategic alliances and social participation and mobilization to overcome the conflict and build peace based upon meeting the legitimate needs and interests of all parties? This includes: building/expanding peace constituencies, increasing social mobilization and participation in peacebuilding and nonviolence, expanding the scale, range and numbers of those involved and engaging all sectors of society in peacebuilding and nonviolence: mobilizing social transformation.
Mutually Acceptable Outcomes	Does the effort enable the development of mutually acceptable outcomes which: 1. Meet the legitimate needs and interests of all parties; and 2. Create critical mass for peace and confidence in the outcome of the conflict for all parties.

Peace Initiatives	Does the effort give rise to effective peace initiatives and actions by increasing numbers/sectors addressing key conflict issues, enabling social participation, and resisting violence/occupation?
Infrastructure for Peace & Nonviolence	Does the effort contribute to building key peace infrastructure: social, state and institutional capacities at all levels for enabling: conflict transformation, peacebuilding, nonviolence, and reconciliation and healing from the conflict?
Peace Forces	Does the effort actively contribute to the building peace and nonviolence forces? In the same way that 'armies' and combatants are necessary for the implementation of war, peace <i>constituencies</i> and <i>forces</i> are necessary for actively <i>doing</i> peacebuilding and nonviolence.
Social Participation & Group Changed Group Behavior	Does the effort reach out to broader numbers/sectors of the society/population and help to enable their participation? Does it help to change the way groups are relating/behaving towards one another in support of peacebuilding and overcoming the conflict?
Resist Violence	Does the effort increase individuals and societies active resistance to violence and refusal to accept all forms of violence?
Meet People's Needs	Does the effort help to meet people's <i>actual</i> and real needs so that they feel secure and feel their needs are being addressed in the process?
Increase People's Security	Does the effort increase people's physical and human security? Important in the present - where people need to feel free from threats to their physical security, their dignity, their identity, and their human well-being - and ensuring people are confident their security (and the security of their children, people, community) will be guaranteed in the future?
Transforming the Environment	Does the effort contribute to transforming the <i>environment</i> in which the conflict is happening: the way people feel about the conflict, about the other, signs and visible manifestations of the conflict (or peacebuilding)? Is it bringing about actual change in the environment in which people are existing and experiencing relations with one another?
Healing	Does the effort help to contribute to healing - at the personal/individual and community/social levels - from the visible and invisible impacts and effects of the conflict, occupation and long history/legacy of violence?

An effort may contribute to one or several of these. It may build capacity, or enable action and *implementation*. What is essential: the effort or its impact should contribute - either directly or in conjunction with other initiatives and efforts at other levels - to bringing about an *actual change* in the conflict. That it have *strategic effect*. The 1996 International Alert Resource Pack for Conflict Transformation identifies 7 additional dimensions which are important reference points for strategic *impact* in resolving/transforming the conflict:

1. **Completeness:** The issues in the conflict have disappeared or cease to be important
2. **Acceptability:** The outcome is acceptable to all parties, not just to one or to their elites
3. **Self-Supporting:** There is no necessity for third party sanctions to maintain the agreement
4. **Satisfactory:** All parties perceive the outcome as just according to their value system
5. **Uncompromising:** No goals have been sacrificed in the form of compromise solutions
6. **Innovative:** The solution establishes new, positive and legitimate relations between the parties
7. **Uncoerced:** The agreement was arrived at without imposition by an outside force

The purpose of peacebuilding and nonviolent action is to bring about *change*. Obstacles, barriers, difficulties in the nature of the conflict and the strategies of those promoting violence/ occupation are part of the very context that peacebuilding and nonviolence need to transform. The success of peacebuilding and nonviolence activities isn't just in their carrying out an event or even achieving their project or operational goals. It's whether those goals and the impact of the project/ action have contributed to *an actual change/transformation* of the conflict.

Palestine-Israel: 8 Major Conflict Engagement Strategies & Gaps and Challenges

This section identifies 8 major trends in strategic thinking shaping conflict parties engagement in Palestine-Israel. A number are overlapping/inter-linking, and include both strategies for peacebuilding, conflict transformation and nonviolence and strategies for victory over the other, domination and control. Each strategy includes options/potential as well as gaps and challenges.

- STRATEGY 1: Peace through Personal Change**
- STRATEGY 2: Peace through Public Opinion/Mass Change**
- STRATEGY 3: Peace through Nonviolent Struggle/Resistance**
- STRATEGY 4: Peace through Delegitimization of the Other**
- STRATEGY 5: Peace through Talks and Negotiations**
- STRATEGY 6: Peace through Victory over the Other**
- STRATEGY 7: Peace through Resistance**
- STRATEGY 8: Peace through Domination/Control**

STRATEGY 1: Peace through Personal Change

Works to bring about change by changing peoples attitudes towards the other. Can include skills and capacity development programs, people to people exchanges, and programs to overcome enemy images, stereotypes and prejudices and replace them with greater mutual understanding and recognition. Trauma healing programs may also focus at the personal level.

Potential: The big potential of *peace through personal change* is that the continuation of the war and occupation rests upon *individuals* accepting it, and either remaining passive, actively supporting, or trying to live their lives ignoring/outside the conflict. Individual attitudes and behaviors are the foundations and context in which the conflict and occupation are possible. Changing these can help change individuals engagements and work for transformation.

Gaps & Challenges:

Limited Impact: Often tried to reach many people but through very short engagements (a few days, or single encounters).

Limited *sustainable* impact/change.

Limited Scale: people to people programs never reached more than 5% of the population.

Lacked *multiplication* so that those reached were able to transfer the experience on to others.

Focus on Attitudes: Most focused on changing *attitudes* but didn't address actual contradictions and issues of the conflict well enough. The fact that 'facts on the ground' were intensifying/worsening the conflict while the programs were going on often didn't help. Instead they were frequently seen as attempts at 'normalization' of relations in the midst of expansion of occupation or continuing violence. *Personal change* (often limited in depth and durability) did not translate in enough cases to *changed engagement/ behavior and* proactive work to (1) prevent violence/occupation and (2) actively transform the conflict at the social, economic, political levels.

STRATEGY 2: Peace through Public Opinion/Mass Change

Works to bring about change through social transformation and changing group relations. Similar to peace through personal change but often implemented through programs reaching/ engaging larger numbers of people. Also includes: public demonstrations and vigils, popular peace movements and peace campaigns, and processes where individual/personal change add up to changing the behavior of groups. Refusal to serve in the Occupied Territories, forming groups/ movements for change, empowering/enabling movements and committees for popular action. This can include: (i) those who believe working jointly across both societies; (ii) those who work in their society but cooperate with people/organizations/partners in the other - with each doing the same work but in their own community; (iii) those who only focus on working in their own community (and may even actively oppose joint work with the other).

Potential: The big potential of peace through mass change is it shows a large, critical mass opposing continuing war and occupation. This shows people they are not alone and that there are others who want to bring about an alternative. It has the potential to engage broader and broader spectrums of the society to create *constituencies* for peace which can actively work to overcome the conflict.

Gaps & Challenges:

Far too little authentically understanding and respecting the 'others' needs, issues and perspectives for most to fundamentally alter people's political and psychological engagement with the conflict.

Public actions were often countered/paralyzed/negatively affected by specific acts and events of the war and occupation, including: killing, suicide bombings, expansion of settlements.

These actions were entirely foreseeable and strategies should have been prepared (individually and by both sides) for how to address them. While often reaching large numbers of people - such as support for public peace proposals - they were not sustained or scaled up enough to bring about actual change.

Contradiction between the message of 'peace is possible' and people's continuing experience of war and occupation.

Key political figures/senior leadership did not provide sustained social/political leadership for peace and nonviolence - and often countered the *peace is possible* message with their own actions and policies.

Too few have been able to sustain themselves with significant social engagement. They lack the strategies for being able to effectively mobilize large scale social participation to transform the conflict/end occupation.

STRATEGY 3: Peace through Nonviolent Struggle/Resistance

Works to bring about change by actively resisting violence and occupation and refusing to accept/surrender to the continuation of the conflict and occupation of Palestine. Uses nonviolent actions and demonstrations. Frequently based upon particular local struggles and local resistance in immediate, local areas. Links are gradually being made between these struggles, and with international solidarity and support. Includes both Palestinian only and joint Palestinian-Israeli actions. Can include either: nonviolent resistance as a means because Israeli occupation *and* military capability is too powerful and/or nonviolence as a principled and strategic movement recognizing that violence re-enforces and legitimizes both the argument of Israeli occupation and marginalization and disempowerment of the Palestinian people and cause.

Potential: To directly resist expansion and continuing of the occupation; to provide a *practical* method of struggle which populations on both sides can participate in. To frame the conflict as a struggle for civil, political, and human rights, and not as war/violence or threat against the other. To support the human and political legitimization of the Palestinian cause to overcome oppression in Palestine, in Israel and internationally. If effective: able to mobilize broad public support internationally, and potentially in Israel as well.

Gaps & Challenges:

There is not enough effort to clearly frame the nonviolent movement in this way: as a clear civil and human rights struggle for freedom and against occupation, and as a struggle for rather than against.

Most of the struggles are still very local. While people may participate from different areas, they have not yet translated into a broader nonviolent *struggle* or transformation of the conflict. Lack of coordination between local villages and each other and local villages ad a national/political struggle and leadership.

Actions are often largely based upon resistance and refusal to surrender, not yet linked with a *political vision and movement* which involves organizing the full capacity of the Palestinian people to overcome the occupation, of Israelis to organize/mobilize to end the occupation, and of Israelis and Palestinians to transform the conflict and build mutually acceptable future(s) beyond it. Actual organization, training and systematic preparation for strategic and principled nonviolent action is still relatively limited. There is significant potential for linking amongst broad sectors of Palestinian (and Israeli) civil society to support nonviolent action and engagement but this is still limited in its scale.

Lack of planning for strategic effect: with concrete goals and objectives not only

for immediate 'actions' but also the impact those actions should have on the conflict, include: impact on solidarity of struggle, impact on those taking part, impact on the army and 'opponents'/partners, impact on public opinion, etc. In its current movement it is often re-enforcing polarized attitudes and analysis of the conflict: still largely built on 'good vs. evil' and enemy images/demonization. There is not enough built into the vision or *operations* and method of the nonviolent actions that *transforms* the logic of the conflict and humanizes both parties. This is essential for nonviolent action to succeed.

STRATEGY 4: Peace through Delegitimization of the Other

Works to bring about peace by delegitimizing the other. This includes demonization of the other, identification of 'betrayals' or negative/violent acts which proves the others ill-intent or desire to do serious disruption/harm/destruction to own community. Includes the argument that 'there is not partner' on the other side or that the other is 'evil/terrorist: used to criticize the Israeli state/ people/army/settlers and the Palestinian authority/ Arabs/militant/violent movements.

Potential: Delegitimizes the other and therefore legitimizes own actions/violence in pursuit of 'defense' or 'ending Israeli' occupation. Supports peace through victory and peace through resistance/control.

Gaps & Challenges:

Serves to further demonize and polarize, entrench conflict and its continuation. While helpful/successful in legitimizing each sides own violence amongst supporters and international allies, offers no effective successful vision for a future resolution of the conflict based upon respect and meeting the legitimate goals and needs of each party - and is therefore strategically bankrupt as an approach to transforming/ ending the conflict and enabling sustainable peace.

STRATEGY 5: Peace through Talks and Negotiations

Works to address the conflict through either:

- talks aimed at building mutual understanding and addressing key issues and conflict drivers to arrive at outcomes which can partially or in full meet key needs and objectives of the parties; or
- power-based negotiation to enforce agreement on outcomes based upon balance of power and diktat.

Provides a framework of engagement for the parties to negotiate together resolution of the conflict and address key needs and issues. Engages political and state leadership as well as major international actors and a range of civil society organizations and experts supporting talks and formal or non-formal confidence building measures.

Potential: Can provide a framework for parties to negotiate and address the actual issues in the conflict and arrive at mutually acceptable outcomes which meet the legitimate needs and interests of all parties.

Gaps & Challenges:

Negotiating frameworks and processes in Israel-Palestine over the past 16 years have rarely addressed key needs and issues of the parties *linked* on both sides with serious intent to implement and address them.

The negotiation process has been carried on *parallel* to expansion of settlements and intensification of the occupation and conflict drivers.

Lacks legitimacy/credibility with numerous people on both sides who have been cultivated - by experience and framing - to not trust the intentions of the other.

Negotiations were separated from *political leadership for peace and transformation of the conflict*. *Civil society* and *people to people* were also not

effectively linked to support peace efforts. The negotiations process failed to address or be supported by processes able to effectively address the underlying dynamics and forces driving the conflict. Local, national and international actors were not sufficiently active to ensure that negotiations were supported by clear commitment for a legitimate peace which would actively respect and address the legitimate needs of both populations: enabling negotiations to become a front of 'legitimacy' for the expansion of conflict.

STRATEGY 6: Peace through Victory over the Other

Seeks to achieve peace through military defeat of the other. Has support amongst spectrums of the population who have lost hope in peace and see armed forces/groups as either *protecting* (punishing terrorists, fighting occupation) or *resisting*.

Potential: Has the potential for short term, tactical 'victories' and for preventing 'victory' of the other but not for achieving a sustainable outcome meeting the legitimate needs of either let alone both parties.

Gaps & Challenges:

Strategically bankrupt as an approach to bringing about an end to the conflict and occupation. While it can *cost* the other, it cannot do so enough to make them surrender/give up, and any current violence today will contribute to retaliatory/retributive violence by the other.

Ultimately: increases anger, suffering, pain and polarization on all sides and is as effective a weapon against each community's own dreams and aspirations as the actions of the 'other' they are trying to defeat.

STRATEGY 7: Peace through Resistance

Seeks to achieve peace by refusing to surrender to the occupation. Includes armed and non-armed resistance. Has become a key mantra/ideology for a number of Palestinian organizations.

Potential: Has the potential of blocking/refusing to accept Israeli occupation (though with limited ability to actually alter/remove the occupation in practice, though it can seek to make it too costly to Israel).

Gaps & Challenges: Lacks clear strategy for how to actually transform the conflict. Resistance alone is not enough. While central to the ideology of many Palestinian groups that they will not surrender and accept occupation and loss of dignity and freedom, it doesn't offer a *positive agenda or political vision* for how to achieve a resolution of the conflict.

STRATEGY 8: Peace through Domination/Control

Seeks to achieve peace by effectively breaking Palestinian aspirations for sovereignty and capabilities to resist ensuring Israeli 'victory'/capability to achieve desired goals. Includes construction of the occupation wall, expansion of settlements and building of settler-only roads across much of the West Bank, extensive network of checkpoints and control of external entry-exit points.

Potential: To continue occupation of Palestine, reduce Palestinian capabilities for resistance, ensure de facto/effective Israeli control and achievement of goals.

Gaps & Challenges:

While largely successful in enabling occupation and preventing *effective, large-scale* resistance/struggle for transformation, it lacks the capacity for long-term acceptability both amongst the Israeli population and for Palestinians and the

internationally community.

Eventually Palestinian resistance/freedom/peace movements and efforts will find a way of effectively challenging a system/approach to the conflict based upon domination and control and suppression of Palestinian aspirations.

Part 3:

Peace and Nonviolence Project Evaluation

Evaluation of peace and nonviolence projects and programs in Israel-Palestine over the past twenty years identifies a number of common characteristics and trends - also familiar from other conflict areas in the 1990s. A key factor is that the *design* of many of these activities, how they were implemented, and the overall lack of effective planning, strategy and cooperation, contributed significantly to the limited impact and effect of most projects. Also, the operating context in which these projects were being implemented continually changed over time - with few of the projects able to effectively engage with or shape these changing dynamics. The following analysis includes key trends, challenges and issues identified in stakeholder consultations. It is not a comprehensive evaluation, but begins to identify some of the major characteristics and challenges which affected (and continue to affect) peacebuilding and nonviolent projects in Israel-Palestine at the systemic levels.

The focus here is largely on challenges and gaps, and understanding the systemic *characteristics* of peacebuilding and nonviolent actions and programs in Israel-Palestine which have prevented them from achieving *cumulative impact and strategic effect*. There have also been many positive, note-worthy and important achievements, and the many practitioners, analysts, trainers, activists and committed Palestinians, Israelis and internationals who continue to work for peace in Israel-Palestine and an end to occupation should be recognized and encouraged. There is also a growing movement to learn the lessons of what has been done, and develop strategies to improve it. The call for this is coming from Palestinians and Israelis actively involved in this work. This call should be heard and supported - and those involved in peacebuilding and nonviolence in Palestine and Israel, including those supporting it as international partners and donors - should reflect upon the *practical evaluation* of past peacebuilding and nonviolent engagements, and take what can be learned from these to improve future operations and strategies.

This section looks at seven key areas of civil society peacebuilding and nonviolence in Palestine-Israel:

- Civil Society Peacemaking and Peacebuilding
- Non-Governmental Organizations
- Joint Activities/Projects
- People to People Projects
- Popular Peace Processes & Joint Accords
- Nonviolent Action & Nonviolent Movement
- Refuseniks

Civil Society Peacemaking and Peacebuilding

"There wasn't enough strategic thinking, but rather a continuation of ad-hoc, sporadically funded activity, with little linkage either to governmental bodies above or large portions of the public below. Planning was left to the imagination of the various organizations, goals were short term with little prioritizing. At the same time, extremists on both sides accompanied the process with violence and accusations of betrayal. The same extremists who were purposely left out of the process turned out to be stronger than it."

(YES PM 2002)

i. The overwhelming majority of projects were small scale, largely dependent on donor funding. The immediate period after the Oslo Agreement saw a significant rise in the number of projects, activities and organizations involved. There was an increase in the number of Israeli and Palestinian organizations and international organizations engaged in peacebuilding activities. Many of the international organizations had little or no previous experience in Israel-Palestine. In several cases, funding for external organizations projects significantly exceeded funding available to local NGOs and engagements. Ironically, and as is often the case, as the capacities of Israeli and Palestinian organizations increased, the scale of funding for peace activities decreased.

ii. Most of this period was characterized by little coordination or cooperation between initiatives. Notably: there was an absence of any comprehensive, strategic, or integrated framework based upon a shared needs assessment, identification of priority areas, and coordination of major lines of engagement. Mechanisms for doing this in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with NGOs, donors, and state actors and authorities were largely lacking. Projects and activities were often ad hoc, frequently based upon good intentions and personal initiative, but less regularly rooted in good program design and development. While some organizations continued their programs over a number of years, most projects lacked follow-through and sustainability.

iii. Lack of coordination and common effort contributed to a lack of cumulative impact: the number and scale of projects and activities supported did not add up to a significant and effective impact on (i) the populations of both sides, (ii) leadership, (iii) root causes or (iv) the dynamics of the conflict. Most projects lacked systematic analysis of the conflict or base-line studies which could inform prioritization and selection of *strategies* and *activities* and from which they could later evaluate and assess impact. The majority of 'peace' activities were directed towards addressing attitudes and relationships through people-to-people projects. Few addressed root causes. Workshops, dialogue projects, training programs were common. Duration was often short, and successes and achievements, where they did occur, were usually not systematically built upon and sustained, except in a few cases.

iv. On the whole, practitioners and analysts assessed that:

- "Peacebuilding activities had no strategic vision or capacity to address realities based on what was actually happening."
- "Peace activists didn't make peace attractive to the majority. Our agenda was not linked well with the needs, concerns, fears or population of both sides."

- "There was a lack of systematic coordination within and between different tracks."
- "Far more could have been achieved if we had planned better what we were doing, worked better together, and designed more relevant programs to create a meaningful impact."

11 Gaps and Challenges Identified by Israeli and Palestinian Analysts and Practitioners

Strategy	No comprehensive/overall strategy guiding peacebuilding engagements. Even individual peace projects and activities often suffered from limited/weak strategy.
Planning	Particularly early on many organizations lacked basic planning and program development. Good planning processes are still weak in many organizations. Organizations may be good at planning 'activities' for projects, but not as good at planning <i>strategy</i> and <i>impact</i> on the conflict.
Resources	Funding of peace activities was limited in comparison to the <i>scale</i> of the need, and the scale of funding for war and intensification of the conflict (through building settlements, the wall/fence). This has grown worse recently as donors shift focus away from peace activities.
Scale	Perhaps the largest gap has been between the scale of peace activities and the scale of the need, i.e. the scale of peace activities has not been sufficient to address the scale of the conflict and challenges and obstacles to peace. Also: the numbers of people actually reached through the activities - due to how they were designed and the resources available for implementing them - was often very small.
Coordination	There was little or no coordination between most projects and organizations. This has somewhat improved within some sectors where the number of actors is now smaller and most know each other, but there are strong divisions (and in some cases antipathies) between many sectors and approaches, and still little or no coordination. This extends to lack of coordination of <i>strategies</i> of engagement, particularly between different sectors with differing approaches.
Links	Little linking of initiatives - including programs addressing the same issues and target groups. Organizations have also had difficulty linking the results and impact of their work with (1) political and conflict party leadership and (2) the broader populations.
Impact	Cumulative impact of peacebuilding activities is notably lacking. On the whole peace activities have had a limited impact on conflict dynamics and facts on the ground.
Sustainability	Most activities suffered from a lack of sustainability rooted in the fundamental design of the activities. These are not individual project failures but systemic failures of the approach to peacebuilding and nonviolence and support for it from the full spectrum of actors involved, including donors. Failure to identify, address and prepare for obvious 'crises' and escalations in the conflict also led many activities to stop or collapse when the situation worsened.
Constraints	There are also very real, practical constraints facing those working for peace or to transform the conflict, from being seen and presented as 'traitors' in their own communities to restraints on movement at checkpoints and blockades to physical attacks, imprisonment and human rights violations. Organizations also face challenges in needing to comply with priorities of donors.
Fault Lines	There are clear geographical, class, social, political and gender gaps in many projects. Areas south of Hebron and in the North are largely uncovered. NGOs often have limited 'acceptability' amongst large sections of the population who have grown increasingly skeptical.
Inclusiveness	Many NGO projects were explicitly 'exclusive': those seen as conflict drivers and 'extremists' were purposefully left out. Projects often tended to focus inwards, reaching those already convinced or 'in the middle.' Recently, many practitioners have strongly identified and argued for the need to engage with broader population groups and especially those seen as critical or hostile to the 'peace' process.

Non-governmental organizations

"Organizations that are funded from the outside tend to lose their accountability to their organic social base and, by extension, its support."

(Morales 2007)

"NGOs have so far been unable to make any serious dents in this sense of apathy and despair, as the larger powers seem to be making all the decisions irrespective of the people."

(Hassassian 2006)

"The social fabric is increasingly fragmented and polarized. Civil society organizations are under pressure."

(Abdelsalam et al. 2009)

i. Civil society organizations in Israel-Palestine have played an often significant and heroic role - from provision of relief and medical services to much of the inspiration, seeds and leadership of the first *Intifada*. They are also criticized as being largely ineffective, weakening political parties (in Palestine, with cadres or leading political analysts and activists joining NGOs rather than parties), and serving donor agendas. In the absence of meaningful political negotiations NGOs have brought forward public peace processes and facilitated dialogues to develop proposals addressing the full range of issues in the conflict. In response to increasing intensity and violence of the conflict and occupation they have helped to support non-violent resistance and creative direct actions, accompaniment, witnessing and delivery of aid and humanitarian support. They are often made up of highly committed, highly professional, capable people.

ii. Much informed criticism of NGOs comes from those working in NGOs themselves. They speak of very low capacity amongst most organizations for strategic planning and impact assessment, a fragmented field, and lack of clear vision and strategy for how to move forward in the current context - both at the level of NGOs and more broadly. Most organizations are identified as small, with limited connections either to the grass-roots and their communities or ability to impact leadership. NGOs have also led to 'NGO-ization' of political activists - with projects and work being shaped to suit the needs of donors rather than the needs of the people and communities and efforts to directly address the conflict. In the period during and after the first Intifada many NGOs in Palestine were seen as being organically linked with and serving the community - part of a broad movement. Today there is increased skepticism, and many NGOs are seen as separate from the people, implementing projects with limited relevance and impact. A further distinction is often made between those organizations which began before Oslo - seen as having deeper political and ideological roots and commitment to overcoming the occupation - and those established after Oslo - many of which are seen as being more 'apolitical' and service oriented. Those working with Israeli counterparts are often presented as 'normalizers.'

iii. In Israel, most peace organizations are relatively small, with some exceptions. Many who work in Israeli peace organizations are seen as "anti-Israeli", "Pro-Palestinian", and "crazy", with low credibility with both the population and leadership and authorities. While they are able to continue with their activities, most have limited impact on the Israeli public and popular opinion. Competition

for funds and deep divergences in analysis and assessment of the conflict and occupation and how to address them have also led to fragmentation within and between organizations. NGOs today are affected by a lack of coherence between and amongst them, divergent strategies, limited donor support, a

challenging operating environment, and limited trust/ confidence from their populations. As strengths, they often have highly committed, hardworking staff, and are searching for ways to make their work more relevant and effective, and to learn the experiences of the last twenty years.

Joint activities/projects

"Despite the importance of the need to have a comprehensive joint-activities strategy, the unanswered questions remain. Can it be done? How? Why? Who should do it? What are the necessary logistics?"

So far there is no coherent, comprehensive strategy for joint activities, no shared knowledge of what should be done, no clear target audiences, no specific kinds of activities to be undertaken, no shared vision of how to reach people and change their attitudes toward peace.

What exists at present is a salad with no chef. You get funding from donors for a joint project. You get involved in the implementation of a project. But maybe somebody else has already done that work or is still doing it. How does your work relate to theirs? Who is looking out for the overall picture?"

The Al-Aqsa intifada made both peoples very skeptical about the chances of peace and such concepts as peace or normalization, which started to have negative connotations in both societies. Even those who had worked with and benefited from joint peace projects, and who had received money to conduct such activities, began saying, "Are you kidding? Are you serious? You're talking about joint peace activities? Where is peace? We are now in a conflict. This is war. We should not be talking to the other. We should not even be thinking in terms of peace." This suggests that in fact no solid base had been established for real peace in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict."

(Dajani and Baskin 2006)

"At times of greater need for joint action, the major peace forces of both sides have been unable to act as protagonists and have been very much influenced by the majorities rather than having any impact on them."

(Kaufman et al. 2006:33)

i. Joint activities have been one of the mainstays of Israeli-Palestinian peace activities for the past 16 years. At its most basic, 'joint activities' refers to activities carried out jointly - in partnership or cooperation - between Israeli and Palestinian organizations, which can also include local authorities, media, universities, schools, academics, professional groups, artists, and people sharing similar profiles, such as former combatants, bereaved families, etc.

ii. These have included many different types of activities, including - but not limited to - joint:

- Workshops

- Conferences
- Training & Capacity Development
- Formal Education Activities
- Exchange Visits
- Dialogue Forums
- Professional Exchanges
- 'People-to-People' Meetings
- Sports Programs and Activities
- Cultural Programs and Activities
- Religious Dialogue
- Environmental Cooperation
- Television Programs
- Film Projects and Documentaries
- Research Projects, Analyses and Publications
- Policy Development and Advocacy
- Vigils
- Public Demonstrations
- Political Struggle & Solidarity Groups
- Nonviolent Actions
- Public Peace Processes

iii. Given the centrality of joint activities in peacebuilding projects in Israel-Palestine it is interesting that until recently there had been very little systematic analysis and assessment of these projects, their strengths, benefits, shortcomings, challenges and weaknesses. Recent efforts to address this include May Kahanoff, Walid Salem, Rami Nasrallah and Yana Neumann's 2007 *The Evaluation of Cooperation Between Palestinian and Israeli NGOs: An Assessment and Bridging the Divide*.

iv. In interviews, a number of key issues affecting joint activities and their implementation were identified:

1. Power Asymmetries and Imbalance

Power asymmetries were widespread. Israeli organizations would often control access to resources and funding opportunities - writing the grants, managing implementation and controlling funds. Palestinian organizations were often seen (and felt to be) 'appendages' rather than real partners. Very few projects managed to develop authentic, shared partnership and ownership of the projects.

2. Different Context and Objectives

Different contexts and objectives on each side significantly impacted effectiveness of many joint activities - from differing funding/salary needs to different goals and objectives. Palestinians often faced significant obstacles to travel, while many Israelis were unwilling to travel to Palestinian areas. While Israeli organizations at times sought high profile visibility for their programs, to show the 'success' of interaction and cohabitation, many Palestinian organizations preferred to have low visibility and media-coverage as reporting on joint activities sometimes made it difficult for them to continue. Little appears to have been done within most projects to meaningfully understand these different needs, perceptions and contexts and to take proactive and practical steps to address them within the projects.

"The wide gaps between the two peoples' motivations for participation create, from the outset, a dilemma for the organizers in setting the goals and meeting the extremely varied expectations of the participants. One of the largest of the gaps is in the capacity to endure the existing situation. For the most part, Israelis engaged in the dialogue may feel a pressing

need for a better solution, but for the most part they are not personally affected as the status quo persists. Palestinians arrive with a feeling that the current situation is the worst possible, and they are searching for an immediate change. It could very well be that the Israelis and Palestinians working on a joint activity are in search of a changed political reality, and it could be that on both sides their personal lives have been affected by the situation. But, for the most part, the Palestinians feel more of a personal sense of concrete urgency about political changes, while the Israelis have the liberty to address things from a more theoretical stand." (Dajani and Baskin 2006:90)

3. Failure to Address Conflict, Develop Mutual Understanding & Shared Analysis

Most joint projects failed to meaningfully develop mutual understanding, solidarity and awareness. Whether the aim was practical cooperation or overcoming enemy images and demonization, failure to generate meaningful mutual understanding, joint analysis and shared ownership often left the projects vulnerable to events and changing conflict dynamics. Lack of shared analysis and understanding of trends developing on each side also led to feelings of betrayal and disappointment, as major developments in the conflict - which could have been easily seen and foretold had strategic conflict analysis been facilitated within the dialogues - caught people off guard. Failure of many projects to address continually unfolding realities in the conflict also led to criticisms and reduced confidence.

4. Susceptibility to Threat/Risk

This left the projects themselves open to risks, and as conflict dynamics worsened - including escalating violence on all sides and continuing expansion of settlements and occupation - most projects were unable to address these developments and stopped.

5. Limited Scope - Narrow or Superficial Impact

Even at the height of Joint Activities, projects were limited to a narrow segment of population on both sides. The scale of activities was also not enough to enable deeper, significant impact, either amongst participants, or broader sections of the population who remained largely untouched by these activities.

6. Project Funding - Dependent

The majority of Joint Activities were dependent on donor funds, and activities and cooperation often ceased when the funds ended. Not enough focus was placed on enabling sustainable structural mechanisms and capacities for joint activities and cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians. Donors themselves also generally failed to coordinate their efforts and support, and to develop coherent approaches to (i) supporting peacebuilding efforts and engagements in Israel-Palestine; (ii) enabling spaces /opportunities for strategic reflection and evaluation and; (iii) supporting strengthening of systemic approaches to peacebuilding helping to link different initiatives and efforts across tracks and levels. Indeed, donors were frequently supporting similar initiatives/engagements, but did not have mechanisms to enable linking or increased cooperation.

v. The short term, one-shot nature of most of these activities contributed to limited accumulation of impact and results. While the goals established for the activities might have been achieved, the activities themselves had limited impact on the overall dynamics, root causes, environment, or driving factors of the conflict.

People to people (P2P) projects

"During the seven years that followed the Oslo Accords between September 1993 and September 2000, \$26 million was spent on people to people activities. That's less than the cost of a Merkava tank. When you think about the \$3 billion that's been put into building the separation wall, you can see that people to people projects were never seriously supported."

(Interview; leading Israeli Practitioner of People-to-People Projects)

"I believe that many P2P initiatives were motivated by a lot of good will of a lot of good people. Many said: let's bring Israelis and Palestinians together. They'll like each other and we will contribute to making peace. Well, Israelis and Palestinian don't automatically like each other and sometimes encounters between them are not so successful. The field of P2P requires professionals to do professional work. Professionals in any field don't do anything without clearly understanding what they do, why they do it, how they do and how they confront challenges when it doesn't all quite go the way they planned for. How can anyone enter this very complex field of P2P without having a clear strategy for their work? I believe that not only should each activity have a strategic plan behind it, I believe that all of the efforts of P2P should have a combined comprehensive strategy behind it. If we are to have impact, real impact on peacemaking, we must work together, NGOs, donors, and governments - Israelis and Palestinians - on a strategic plan or strategic plans. We must think and act strategically."

(YES PM 2002:44)

i. People to People (P2P) projects are implemented with the aim of peacemaking and peacebuilding between the peoples of Israel and Palestine⁹. A focus on *attitudes* and *relationships* and how people relate to and understand one another is central to most P2P projects.

ii. In Israel-Palestine, most P2P projects throughout the 1990s placed the emphasis principally on encountering and overcoming enemy images and demonization. A central objective of many P2P activities was to humanize relationships between Israelis and Palestinians. A range of events and activities, from exchanges, to camps, sporting events, and other initiatives were arranged to help people meet people from the other side and overcome enemy images, stereotypes and demonization that may have developed during the conflict.

iii. While many of these events were powerful and exciting for those involved, they often had little significant or lasting impact. This was not because the *aim*, *purpose* or *intention* of P2P projects is wrong. Building real trust, mutual understanding, and relationships beyond the conflict is essential for sustainable peacebuilding and to prevent continuing violence and occupation. Instead, the major challenges came in the *design* and *implementation* of the projects.

"People like to think P2P was important and supported, but it wasn't taken seriously by anyone or meaningfully supported. P2P was an afterthought. No

donors committed large- scale serious commitment. Donors insisted on 'results oriented work' and results-oriented outputs. Since these couldn't be easily measured, they focused on high publicity work rather than long-term, patient work to make change. P2P was the flavor of the day: every organization that had

or thought they should have involvement saw there was money available. The popular rush took away money from those who were doing serious work. YES PM was a self-critique of P2P. We interviewed 65 organizations. One of our major questions was "what was your strategy?" People didn't have a clue. Most of them. Those that survived the 2nd Intifada, however, did have a strategy. They were committed, professional, dedicated. The 'amateurs' stopped. The international donor community never took this seriously. Today, less than 1% of people under the age of 18 have ever met someone from 'the other side'. Less than 5% of the populations overall. There's no real support for it, even if the need is clearly greater than ever."

(Consultation with a leading P2P Practitioner)

iv. Below are 6 Lessons from review of Israeli-Palestinian P2P Projects and interviews with participants and organizers:

1. Process Matters

How P2P projects are implemented is essential. Selection of participants, preparation, facilitating encounters, supporting interactions, and the methodologies used in the events and activities themselves play a major role in shaping the value and impact of the experience. While some P2P projects were very well developed, prepared and implemented, many lacked good process and methodology. Developing good guidance notes and proper training and preparation for those doing P2Ps is essential.

2. Real Issues Have to be Addressed

A central tenet of many P2P projects is 'encountering' and contact theory: focusing on bringing together participants from the different communities and enabling spaces and opportunities for interaction. This is essential. However, if it is not combined - at the right and appropriate moments and with proper attention and care - with addressing real issues in the conflict and affecting people's lives, the projects will have little meaningful impact. Many P2P projects refused to address conflict issues because they were seen as too contentious and divisive. Relationships were formed, and small steps were taken to humanize the other, but deeper mutual understanding of each other's needs, contexts, issues and perspectives, and what was actually happening on the ground, was often excluded. This led to fragility and lack of relevance in many of the projects, with little to no sustainable impact.

3. Frequency of Encounters - Systematic Interactions

In a conflict which has gone on for as long as the conflict in Israel-Palestine, where the majority of people on both sides have little or no opportunities for interaction, and in which there is wide-spread demonization, polarization, blaming and development of enemy images, short, one-off encounters are not enough. Even programs which last for 2-4 weeks will have limited impact if they are not followed up on. Enabling regular opportunities for meetings and interaction, and creating platforms for action to address conflict issues, are essential if P2Ps are to have an impact on conflict dynamics and success in building healthy relationships between parties on all sides.

4. What Happens After is as Important as what Happens During

Focusing on what happens *during* the activity is not enough. P2P programs need to be designed with clear understanding and awareness of the context and situations participants will face when they return home. The aim of a P2P should not just be to have an event and then have it

finished. It should be to have a meaningful impact on peacemaking and peacebuilding, transforming attitudes, behaviors and relations, and supporting transformation of the conflict. Far too little focus was placed in most P2P projects on what happened *after* the project, when participants would return to their communities.

5. Design for 'Take Home' and Multiplication: Prepare for Intra-Community Work In the long-run, capacity building is an essential component of P2P projects, and should be linked to P2P strategies from the beginning. The aim should not be to have participants dependent upon the project for meeting/acting, but to enable them to become carriers of change in their communities. P2P projects should include working with participants to support them for intra-community work, multiplying the impact of the project.

6. Plan for Communications & Outreach: Work with Media and Opinion Leaders Often P2P projects have to be done quietly in order to happen. Participants may be at risk if their participation is known. Publicity may sometimes make it difficult for a project or activity to be carried out. However, in the long run, finding appropriate and effective means of communicating what is being done in P2Ps is essential. Projects should consciously develop communication and outreach strategies. Working with media and opinion leaders, and mobilizing vocal support and encouragement for peacebuilding and peacemaking efforts, is part of the process of transforming attitudes and opinions relating to peacemaking in both populations.

From Activity to Impact

Participant reflections on P2P processes:

1. "The encounters were depoliticized. There were only about similarities - dancing, football, food. We never discussed any of the real issues in the conflict or what was affecting us. "
2. "Face-to-face meetings put occupier and occupied on the same footing. We didn't address the reality of the conflict: that we were living under occupation. The violence needed and needs to be addressed, but unless we also tackle what the conflict is about, meetings which help us 'get to know each other' without addressing what we're actually doing to each other just create a sense of frustration and betrayal."
3. "Most of the meetings were hidden or held abroad. They had very limited impact on broader populations. Often we'd have to hide that we were taking part because we knew we'd be criticized by others who saw the meetings as 'normalization'. While Israelis often wanted to promote the events to show that there was actual work being done for peace and to counter the negative demonization of Palestinians, many Palestinian participants were concerned that the talks not be made public or they would face criticism or pressure from their own groups and communities."
4. "A major shortcoming was the failure to address people's needs and what was actually happening to them. Palestinian needs had to do with ending the occupation, ending the building of settlements, roads, the wall, Israeli army incursions and the violence, killing and human rights violations that have gone

with these. Israeli needs had to do with ending suicide attacks and killings of Israelis, and the feeling of insecurity, threat and betrayal this created for Israelis who saw themselves as working for peace, without necessarily knowing what the situation was actually like for Palestinians. Our meetings were often extremely powerful and helpful, but they didn't help us enough to understand what could we do to change what was happening outside the room. Eventually, what was happening outside overwhelmed what we were doing inside, and broke down the trust and confidence we'd been working to build up. It should have been the other way around: our work should have been the basis for bringing what we were doing to our communities more broadly, and transforming relations between Israelis and Palestinians."

5. "While we've had good links with senior leaders on both sides we haven't been able to directly impact decision-makers. Instead, their policies have often seemed to exacerbate and escalate the conflict."

6. "One of our major challenges has been and continues to be serious limitations on funding. Donors say they want peacebuilding but there isn't the support necessary to do it on the scale that will make a difference. Compare the amount that's given for arms sales or a single Israeli tank, or what's been invested in building the wall, with the support given to people to people projects."

7. "A key missing element was not focusing enough on how to bring what we were doing back to the community; how to be multipliers. Changing attitudes and mindsets isn't enough. Soldiers are trained for fighting. We should have been trained to see how we could do peacebuilding in our communities, and how we could have responded better when violence was escalating. Maybe there are things we could have done, but we didn't give this enough focus and attention. Instead, we kept doing the same 'people to people' projects even when we knew they weren't working, or when people more broadly were turning against the peace process."

8. "Eventually as the violence escalated and as leadership on both sides acted in a way that destroyed people's confidence in peace, we lost public legitimacy and confidence. We also didn't have enough of a strategy for reaching out to people and working with the media for them to really understand and support what we were doing. What we were achieving was inspirational, but it was often behind closed doors. If people had been able to see the courage and discussions we saw, it would have given them greater confidence and hope for peace. We should have found ways to bring this out more publicly, and to make sure the public saw the importance and legitimacy of what we were doing."

(Critics of P2P projects)

"In a broader view, activists in P2P organizations indicated that there was a sense that a public peace process, or the people-to-people process, was very much an afterthought. There did not seem to be a clear, coherent and rational strategy for this work offered at almost any level - by politicians, donors, and the NGOs themselves. There was almost no coordination amongst the protagonists of this work. There seemed to be little donor coordination as well. Only later, when it was becoming clear that the peace process was gradually but steadily being derailed did some members of the donor-community consider the importance of coordination of this work and the need to intervene by providing a mechanism for evaluation and collective thinking. By this time, there was already considerable bitterness on the Palestinian side and a general sense by many that the 'People-to-People' activities were not having the impact desired and hoped for by the activists initiating them."

(YES PM 2002: 63)

Popular peace processes and joint accords

"Another development is the emergence of the new civil initiatives for peace, mainly the Peoples Voice project of Ami Ayalon and Sari Nusseibeh and the Geneva initiative. Both are 'based on the assumption that if a sufficiently strong wave of public support for resuming the political negotiations is generated, decision-makers will not be able to ignore it. Also a much publicized campaign winning the support of many thousands on each side will signal to the other side that despite the hostilities and killings, the "silent majority" of the people on both sides are still interested in peace."

(Hermann 2006:54)

"...lately there were serious attempts by Israelis and Palestinians to establish common/joint political platforms to end the conflict and set short- and long-range strategies to deal with pending final status issues. Vivid examples are the Nusseibeh and Ayalon Initiative and Abed Rabo and Beilin Geneva Initiative. Both initiatives were received by Israelis and Palestinians with mixed feelings; however, one cannot but appreciate such attempts that are considered to be bold, relative, and innovative."

(Hassassian 2006:82)

"The statement that "There is a Partner - Peace is Possible" has been illustrated by the massive showing in the street via petitioning of the Ayalon/Nusseibeh national accord and the mailing to every single household (in Arabic and Hebrew) of the "Geneva Accords" in summary and full text. The Bereaved Families Froum's Hello Shalom/Salam campaign of connecting Israeli and Palestinians by phone reached the figure of 40,000 calls and more than one million minutes of conversation, providing a direct method of 'people-to-people' interaction during very difficult times. Such initiatives have a slow but cumulative impact on both sides and should be pursued. The settlers and their supporters have conquered the streets with posters and car stickers. Perhaps the peacebuilders can do better, while also using tools that demonstrate a massive public participation."

(Kaufman et al.2006:210)

i. Popular peace processes and joint accords brought forward by Israeli and Palestinian civil society organizations and those who have played a role in previous negotiations represent a significant step forward. They build upon the work of earlier civil society peacebuilding engagements to address three major current challenges in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:

- They present a *vision* of a mutually acceptable outcome which meets the legitimate needs and interests of both populations. While stakeholders may have differences with some aspects and details of the agreements, their aim is to create an image of what a possible outcome may look like. Creating popular spaces for engagement with broad sectors of the population on both sides in discussing and developing these proposals further could provide a good opening for increased engagement and

participation.

- They are the result of joint engagement by Israelis and Palestinians at a time when violence had significantly escalated and the message being given to many was that there was no significant 'partner' for peace on the other side.

- They created a space /opportunity for Palestinians and Israelis to show their support for peace and opposition to continuing violence and occupation through their use of public demonstrations and declarations/petitions in support of the agreements.

ii. The potential shortcomings/draw-backs they face are that:

- While they have been able to gain large numbers of signatories and supporters, they have not yet been able to translate this into *continuing popular engagement and clear strategies* for how to achieve the agreement outlined in the proposals. They represent important *citizens' peacemaking initiatives*, but have not at the same time managed to develop *citizens' strategies for peacebuilding and nonviolence*.

- Unless they are able to engage with broader sectors of those working for peacebuilding and nonviolent transformation of the conflict and to mobilize support from key social sectors - business, political leadership, media, academics, community leadership and the broader public - their impact will be limited.

- They have been brought forward at a time of deep intensification of the conflict. There is a significant challenge for them, therefore, to counter the dominant narratives of enemy images, violence and blame, and lack of serious political leadership for peace.

iii. The significance of these popular peacebuilding and joint accords initiatives lies in their recognition that peacebuilding and bringing an end to the conflict and the occupation in Palestine and Israel is too important to leave to political and military leadership. Creating spaces for social participation and addressing the key issues and drivers of the conflict is essential. To increase their effectiveness greater effort needs to be placed on developing *effective strategies* for increasing the scope and range of supporters and those participating in the development of these proposals, and in combining *peace proposals* with *strategies for implementation and mobilization* of the populations in their support.

iv. In this respect the initiatives have shown great creativity in communicating their work to the populations on both sides and in public outreach. What is missing is effective *organizing* of popular engagement in support of peace on the scale required - something which may be beyond the capacity of any single institution or civil society organization and can only be achieved through increasing coordination, solidarity and joint action guided by clear and realistic strategies and effective actions and operations.

Nonviolent action and nonviolent movement

i. As violence in Israel-Palestine has escalated and the construction of the wall, expansion of settlements, road-building, and checkpoints has increased, Palestinian communities have been searching for *direct* and *active* means of resistance to the occupation. This has given rise to the beginnings of a new phase in nonviolent struggle in Palestine.

ii. Nonviolence has a long history in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and gained greatest prominence during the first Intifada. During the period of the Oslo Accords, the potential of nonviolent engagement to transform the conflict and prevent further intensification/ escalation of violence and occupation was largely marginalized in favor of formal negotiations and peacebuilding projects. The potential to build upon the achievements of the first Intifada and deepen capacity and cooperation for nonviolence within Palestine and between Palestine and Israel was therefore neglected or sacrificed.

iii. Current nonviolent campaigns and initiatives are largely centered around specific locations - Bil'in, Nil'in, communities in and around Nablus - and responding to the specific manifestations of the occupation in those areas (the building of the wall/fence, check-posts, destruction of homes and orchards). There is not yet *national* coordination of nonviolent actions or the development of a Palestinian nonviolent *movement*, though steps are being taken in those directions.

iv. Currently, the persistence and dedication of nonviolent actions in places such as Bil'in and Nil'in has been an inspiration to people both in Palestine and internationally. Unfortunately, within Israel there appears to be limited knowledge/awareness of these actions. In those cases where people are familiar with them or have even heard of them, they often have sharply different/distorted understandings and interpretations of what is happening there. Few Israelis have direct experience with the nonviolent action and the Israeli media largely does not report it. There is a *key* and *fundamental* need therefore to improve the ability of the nonviolent actions to have their message heard *inside* Israel.

v. Without increasing the scale of the nonviolent actions - both in geography and social participation - and linking them with a clear political vision and strategy for ending the occupation, they can provide *local resistance* but not transform/end the occupation. Local nonviolent resistance, however, is providing a foundation from which a broader, national movement can develop. Key to this will be to bring in broader sectors of the Palestinian population and to extend the movement beyond rural communities to also include participation by urban populations. Increased engagement and active participation and support by political leadership and the broad spectrum of civil society organizations would also be important for expanding the scale of nonviolent action.

vi. The presence of Israelis within the nonviolent actions has given a powerful message for many Palestinians, showing authentic solidarity and support from Israeli citizens. Unfortunately, for the most part, these remain marginalized within Israel and are seen as extremists and in some cases *terrorists* or *traitors* by large portions of Israeli. Preparing the Israeli public for *cultural acceptance* of nonviolence and peaceful efforts to overcome the conflict and occupation is important.

vii. The presence of internationals also provides key support - though there is at times concern that this presence prevents the development of a fuller, nationally owned non-violent struggle in Palestine. Still, international presence and support has been appreciated, both in nonviolent actions and at checkpoints. The presence of internationals is seen as raising awareness of Palestinian resistance which would otherwise not receive as significant attention in international media. Sadly, when a foreign citizen is wounded or killed it is seen as being more 'newsworthy' than when a Palestinian is wounded or killed.

viii. Training, preparation, organization and strategy appear key challenges for nonviolent action in Palestine. There are superb trainers and activists and they are now working to increase the numbers of people trained, but current actions on the ground show a lack of effective training, strategy and preparation behind the actions. While they are able to show resistance and serve to rally people's

opposition to the walls, and to have minor tactical victories in Israeli courts, they currently have had limited impact on:

- Increasing opposition to occupation within Israel and amongst the pillars of the Israeli occupation;
- Increasing broad-based sustained engagement and social participation in nonviolent struggle in Palestine.

ix. Importantly, nonviolent action, to be effective, has to be linked with effective organization of the struggle, engaging the population in working to overcome occupation. Building alliances more broadly with sectors across Palestine and Israel will be key. *Resistance* alone is not enough, and is not the goal of those engaging in the actions. The aim of a nonviolent movement is to overcome and transcend all forms of violence, injustice and occupation - for all parties involved.

Key needs identified by nonviolent activists, trainers and practitioners:

- How to enable effective leadership at the local and national levels for a broad-based nonviolent movement?
- How to make the movement effective: improving the impact of actions and developing a strategy which can build the movement and bring about real change?
- How to get internationals to be more consistent and proactive in giving support – not only to wait for something wrong to happen but to proactively give their support?
- How to overcome people's doubts and skepticisms about nonviolence and see that it does not mean surrender but is a principled and effective way of ending the occupation of Palestine?
- How to link together with other actors, sectors, villages and key groups - media, students, civil society, business, leadership - to create authentic support and engagement in nonviolence in Palestine?

Answers given to this within Palestine include:

- Respecting and regenerating Palestinian democracy at every level - creating authentic ownership and participation by the Palestinian people and real leadership;
- Looking within Palestine's own history as well as the history of other conflicts to show its power and success - and to learn from these how to organize, plan and carry out nonviolent actions effectively;
- To build the movement. People must first believe. The first step is to convince them, to reach the point that they believe, they know, it will work. People need to know the effectiveness of the struggle, and that international and Israelis (in time) will support it.

Challenges

- At the moment the *movement* of nonviolent action is relatively small in Palestine, though it is growing;
- There are increasing efforts at coordination and building the broad alliance of Palestinian communities and organizations involved in nonviolent action, but there is still extensive fragmentation;
- There is yet no effective *solidarity* between struggles and actions though this is being addressed;

- The logic and psychology of the actions has *limited impact* on the broader Palestinian and Israeli populations and broad international public opinion. It also has limited impact on key pillars of the Israeli occupation, such as the Israeli Defense Force.
- Nonviolent action at the current scale/level will not be sufficient to achieve strategic impact. It is key to see how it can be supported and developed further.

Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions (BDS)

The BDS campaign has been growing with support from many organizations inside Palestine and internationally. Its potential strength would be in raising clearly the issue of financial support given to the occupation and illegal settlements and building domestic and international resistance to this. If this is done in an 'us vs. them', 'good vs. evil' framework though, in which Israel is demonized or perceived to be demonized, it will strengthen solidarity/support within Israel in opposition to the campaign. Essential to the BDS movement and broader nonviolent struggle in Palestine is to see how to *bring forward the legitimate goal of ending the occupation and enabling a vision of the future and realistic outcome of the conflict which will meet the legitimate needs of both peoples.*

Refuseniks

"The phenomenon of refusal is gaining ground in the Israeli army, and thus far refusers include a group of at least twenty-seven reserve pilots, four former chiefs of Israel's powerful domestic security service, the military's current chief of staff, and a separate list of 574 army reservists. In addition, by spring 2002 there were a thousand former officers, among them generals, who called on Israel to withdraw unilaterally from the territories. The statements by reservists are being organized by Courage to Refuse."

(Abu Nimmer 2006: 155)

- i. The Israeli Army ('Defense Force') is seen by the overwhelming majority of Israelis as a key national institution protecting the safety and security of Israelis - and specifically of Jews - as a people. It is seen by Israelis as one of the most civilized and professional armies in the world; a barrier against threat and attack. It is an institution broadly respected by the population. Criticism of the army is often seen as unpatriotic or threatening the security of Israel.
- ii. Over the years, a growing number of Israeli soldiers and officers have questioned the role and use to which the Israeli army has been put, both in the war and occupation of southern Lebanon and the war and occupation of the Palestinian Territories. Many of those questioning the role the army has played are themselves committed soldiers and recognize and value the role of the army in national defense. At the same time, they are conscientious soldiers, supporting *legitimate defense* but questioning the particular role the army has been given in the occupation of Palestine (and previously Lebanon). Questioning the role of the army goes strongly against the grain of the culture and traditional role given to the army in Israel, but is seen as a necessity by those who feel a conflict between what they are being forced to do as members of the army and what they consider their duty and responsibilities as human beings and Israeli citizens.
- iii. The causes of soldiers refusing to serve/fight are multiple. Many are opposed to what they see as an increasingly violent attitude towards Palestinians and Arabs, and the effects they believe the continuing occupation is having on *Israeli*


society. Others refuse out of a gut instinct and refusal to participate in what they know is wrong. Many refusing military service are apolitical and do not want to be involved in war/occupation.

iv. Refuseniks have included both senior ranking officers in the army and intelligence services, air force pilots and soldiers. Given the traditional role of the Israeli soldier and the value placed upon it within the Israeli polity, refusal by soldiers and officers carries a potentially powerful message.

Annex

Six Tools for Strategic Thinking, Planning and Evaluation

These six tools have been selected from a range of tools at the forefront of strategic planning and program development for peacebuilding and nonviolence.



They represent operational tools used by organizations in planning their engagements. Their relevance, however, is much broader, and they can be used for planning strategy and activities of movements and social and political engagements for transformation. Cumulatively, they highlight key considerations in strategic planning and strategic effectiveness and may be used singly or together. Each is referenced for those wishing to go further into exploring their relevance and how to apply them.

1. Designing Peacebuilding Programs: 7 Steps of Strategy (DPO)

Some Notes/Context:

This is a very simple/basic Strategic Planning Framework - it does not claim or try to be more. It has been developed by drawing upon 'steps in strategic planning' from several fields: development work, peacebuilding, business, military strategic planning, nonviolent movements, and others. While the steps go from 1-7, it is not a '*linear*' process i.e. it *does not* go from 1 to 2 to 3 to 4 to 5, etc. Instead: it is intended to identify components of a strategic planning process. In an actual strategic process, several of these steps would be implemented regularly throughout the process or at planned periods. Its aim is to make the process conscious and to have practitioners and organizations/agencies actively reflect upon them. It is specifically intended to be simple. The 7 steps can be easily remembered and organizations and strategic planners can check whether they've addressed them. It is not meant to be 'rigid'. Instead, practitioners and organizations are encouraged to actively engage with it and customize it to their needs, approach and context. Step 6 'Relevance' is to ensure the approach is custom-designed for the needs of the organization, culture and context. There are many different approaches for each of these steps. It can be useful for organizations/agencies to identify and assess (a) what tools and approaches they use and (b) to make visible practical, effective, useful tools, methodologies and approaches that may be specifically relevant for their needs and contexts in a way in which they can apply concretely in their work, drawing from the rich spectrum of what has been developed.

The 7 steps include:

STEP 1 - Where are we now? Tools and Methodologies for Situation Assessment, including Strategic Conflict Analysis and mapping yourself and where you are as an organization (including capacities, approaches, entry points, relationships, goals, agendas, etc.)

STEP 2 - Where do we want to go? Vision and Goal Setting & Desired Future: Consciously identifying what is the change we want to make/contribute to, what is the goal we're working for. This can address two levels: 1. overall change we want to make/ achieve/contribute to on the conflict/context/situation; 2. the direct goal of what we want to achieve through our program/intervention.

STEP 3 - Engagement Strategy. Which Path Shall we Choose? Recognizing that many organizations do not consciously reflect upon or decide what strategy they will use but engage with strategies because that's what they've always done, that's what they know, or that's what they assume/believe to be appropriate. This step brings forward a series of practical methodologies and

tools for identifying, reflecting upon, and challenging our strategies and assumptions.

STEP 4 - Action. The actual steps for achieving the strategy. Which Milestones form the Path? Interventions: This step looks at what stakeholders/countries/movements are doing in practice to realize/achieve their strategy - the concrete, specific, actual activities they are carrying out and *how* they are carrying them out (operations, engagements, tactics, means).


STEP 5 - Reflective Practice: This step helps stakeholders develop practical, relevant tools for monitoring and evaluation of their programs, activities, and impacts, including both impact of the project/activities on stakeholders, conflict dynamics, and their operating context and environment, and the impact of the conflict, operating context, and stakeholders on their projects and activities. It's purpose is in part to help organizations be better able to act in dynamically developing environments and contexts and know how to adjust or realign their programs and work as necessary to be relevant and appropriate - rather than just implementing engagements which may not be successful or may not have the impact they desire or are aiming for.

STEP 6 - Relevance. Customized Methodology: Step 6 takes practitioners and organizations through the different steps and tools and to see what makes sense and what is relevant for them in their contexts and organizations. The point is very clearly not to come up with a rigid/ imposed/artificial methodology and say 'these tools must be used everywhere'. Instead, it is to engage with practitioners and organizations to consciously reflect upon what they are (or may not) be doing, and what approaches can help to improve strategy and engagements. Here, it is essential that the approach not 'add' dramatically to people's work load but form a coherent methodology that enables them to do what they're doing in a more effective and better way and in the realities of the context they're in - while enabling them to *transform* those realities to achieve their desired goals/objectives.

STEP 7 - Making it Possible. Building Required Capacity. It's not enough to identify a good methodology or approach. To enable organizations to be able to practically implement their strategy and actions it it's important to see how it fits at the levels of their: mandates and mission, policies, strategies, operational frameworks, tools and methods used, staff, and culture and approaches to implementing their projects. In a community/country, it is essential that the necessary capabilities needed to implement the strategy are developed and enabled, and that the strategy resonates with the culture and needs of the people. This step involves very practical engagement with organizations/movements combining organizational development with assisting in the development of customized methodologies for their needs and contexts.

2. Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) Matrix - Collaborative for Development Action

The RPP Matrix follows much the same logic as the 7 Steps of Strategy. It helps as a simple/straight forward tool to place emphasis on identifying *where* you are trying to bring about change (with more people or key people) and *what* type of change you are trying to bring about (whether individual/personal change or socio-politico-economic change). It helps to draw the distinction between the **real** or actual changed achieved through an operation (project/activity) and the desired change. Real/actual change refers to the immediate/actual outputs of an action and the outcome on those *directly* involved/affected. It can be clearly identified and recognized. Desired change refers to the broader impact actors often *hope* their actions may have. In reality, there is often a significant *gap* between the actual change brought about through an action/operation and the desired change. This *gap* often relates to the *missing link* between the actual outcomes and results of a project and the *broader change* or *impact* on the



context/conflict that actors are hoping to have. The RPP Matrix is also useful for highlighting: Step 1: Current Situation/ Conflict Analysis & Step 2: Peace Write Large: Desired Goal/Future. In *strategies for peacebuilding* understanding the current situation - including the goals, perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, fears, hopes, concerns and needs of different stakeholders, root causes, contradictions, underlying fault lines and dynamics - is an essential and necessary foundation for being able to develop *appropriate* and *relevant* strategies for how to address/transform it. Developing a clear vision of a *desired goal/future* which also respects and makes room for the legitimate needs of all parties/actors involved in and affected by the conflict is also essential for enabling a *sustainable outcome* and transformation of the conflict. Stakeholders

- including NGOs, conflict parties, governments, donors - often do not carry out a strategic conflict analysis and lack a clear vision of an inclusive future. There is also often a gap between their operations, engagements, tactics and means and *what would be* needed to actually bring about a meaningful change in the situation. This *gap* is something essential to understand to see *how* and *why* existing strategies and operations may not be achieving the goals parties want, and to being able to improve - as needed and appropriate - strategies, means and tactics.

3. Reflective Peace Practice³ (J.P. Lederach)

1. Overall Goal:				
2. How:				
3. "Theory"/Logic of Change				
4. Type of Change				
	PERSONAL	RELATIONAL	STRUCTURAL	CULTURAL
ACTIVITIES				
THEORIES				
CHANGE TYPES				
INDICATORS				

The "Reflective Peacebuilding" Toolkit model developed by John Paul Lederach and his colleagues - presented here in an adapted form - is a pioneering step to enable effective strategic and operational planning for peacebuilding by practitioners and policy makers⁴ The table presents an integrated framework for reflective design and planning addressing *goals*, *strategies* (how), *operations* and *means*. It also adds the level of *indicators* for practitioners to identify the changes connected to an intervention/action⁵.

How to use the table:

1. **Overall Goal:** Identify the *overall goal* - the desired change or future - you are trying to achieve through your program. This can be done at the *program* level (the change you wish to see as an immediate/direct result of your engagement/operation) and at the strategic level (the change you wish to see in the overall context/conflict as a result of your strategic intervention/ engagement).

2. **How:** *How* will you achieve this goal? What is your *strategy/approach* to achieving this change?

³ The version of this diagram has been modified from the original, which can be found in the 'Reflecting for Peace Practice' Toolkit. This particular version is used by the DPO in its Peacebuilding Program/ training design.

⁴ "Reflective Peace-building" (Lederach et al. 2007).

⁵ "Reflective Peace-building Toolkit and Search for Common Ground's Designing for Results" "Indicators consist of information that signals change. An indicator is a quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to reflect the changes connected to an intervention. Indicators enable perception of differences, improvements or developments relating to a desired change (objective or result) in a particular context. "Indicators are inevitable approximations. They are not the same as the desired change, but only an indicator of that change. They are imperfect and vary in validity and reliability.


3. **"Theory of Change"/"Logic of Change"**⁶: Why do you believe that doing this will achieve the change you want to bring about? Identify step-by-step the assumptions and logic underlying your strategy. Identify: your analysis of the situation, what you think is causing it, what you think needs to be transformed/addressed/changed, what you're going to do to change it, how that will change it, what impact that change will have, and how it will bring about the overall change in the situation you are hoping to achieve or contribute to. This usually involves at least six to ten 'hypothesis' or steps in thinking/logic - a chain of logic/reasoning) of why and how an actor believes their strategy, operations and activities and the means they are using are appropriate for the situation and to bring about the desired change they wish to see.

4. **Type of Change**: Refers to the actual change you are trying to bring about as a direct/immediate result of your engagement and action. The table distinguishes between 4 levels or areas:

Personal	Changes in people's attitudes and behavior, the way they think, act, perceive and engage in the conflict. Can also include skills, address stereotypes/needs/fears/goals at the personal level.
Relational	Referring here to direct face to face contact and <i>inter-personal</i> relations. When conflict escalates, communication patterns change, stereotypes are created, polarization increases, trust decreases. Developing practices of cooperation, mutual respect collaborative decision-making, and constructive conflict handling mechanisms can be positive relational changes.
Structural	Moves beyond direct relationships to relational patterns that involve and affect whole groups/populations. Structural change can be approached in many different ways: transforming social conditions, transforming procedural and institutional patterns.
Cultural	Addresses deeper and often less conscious patterns related to conflict and peace based upon parties beliefs and value systems, world-views, and <i>cultures</i> of peace and violence.

In Lederach's model these levels of transformation are not completely separate, but are woven in with one another:

⁶ Theories of 'Change', as a practical tool for understanding, planning, designing and reflective evaluation of peacebuilding work, is a major development pioneered in recent years by Lederach as well as organizations such as 'Search for Common Ground'.



The first step is to then identify in what way your operations/activities are actually addressing any or all of these levels of transformation: what are you doing that will bring about/effect change at the *personal, relational, structural* or *cultural* levels in the conflict.

Then: what is the theory or logic behind this? Why do you think doing this will have the effect you want, and why is that effect important - linking the change you are trying to bring about at the level of your activity/operations with the overall goal and strategic impact you are trying to achieve.

Third: what actual *types of change* are you directly contributing to through your activities? What immediate, measurable, identifiable changes are occurring as a direct result of your activities?

Fourth: can you identify possible *indicators* - qualitative or quantitative - that will help you to see if what you're doing is actually have the result/impact you want to achieve? This is a very thorough, in-depth and rigorous reflective approach to strategic development, design and planning of programs and operations to bring about change in a conflict situation.

The logic of the model flows from 'overall goal' through 'how' (strategy) to the theory and assumptions, or *logic/reasoning* underlying this and then to the actual types of change you are trying to bring about through your actions and operations. Having gone through this, it can then be very powerful - as a next step - to move in the other direction, identifying:

1. What actual *activities* are you doing?
2. What immediate *outputs* will result?
3. What *outcomes* will you or have you achieved through your activity (where *outcomes* are *immediate/direct* changes resulting from your engagement/ activity)?
4. What *impact* - or actual/real contribution to changing the situation/changing the conflict at the strategic level does this have?; and from there go back to:
5. *Inputs*: In order to achieve this and to carry out your activities in a way that they will produce the outputs, outcomes and *impact* on the situation you wish to achieve, what *inputs* are needed to be able to do those activities effectively and in a way that will bring about *real* and *actual* change at the strategic level and contribute to achieving your *overall goal/vision of the future* beyond the conflict.

4. Peacebuilding Log Frame⁷

Inputs	Activities	Outputs	Outcomes	Impact
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
What inputs are needed in order to be able to successfully do these activities in such a way that they will actually achieve the outputs and

⁷ Adapted from Paffenholz 2005.

outcomes desired in order to have a *strategic impact* on the conflict/situation?

Note: A 'Logical Framework' is often one of the most resisted planning instruments amongst NGOs and practitioners. It is seen as being an 'imposition of the donors' and too rigid and bureaucratic. When understood effectively though it can be a highly practical and valuable planning tool for *working to bring about effective change*. It moves from *strategy* to *planning operations* and identifying: from any type of 1. activity or project (people to people dialogues, Track II mediation, direct nonviolent action, workshops, training programs, boycotts) - what will be the 2. actual/real outputs (*visible results of activities*), what 3. Outcomes (immediate/actual changes *directly* resulting from the activity) will these create and what 4. *impact* will this actually have - if it will have any - on the conflict situation or strategic context. And: in order for all of this to happen and really work, what 5. *inputs* (human, financial and non-financial resources, skills, knowledge, relationships, capacities) are needed.

5. Linking Operational Results-Strategic Impact on Conflict. DPO



This diagram develops further from the first four focusing specifically on making visible the link between:

1. Project or Operational Results (Outputs and Outcomes of the project);
2. Strategic Impact on the Conflict.

In most cases, *project or operational results* have little or not impact on the actual overall/broader conditions and the strategic dynamics and directions of

the conflict. While they may bring about limited/immediate changes amongst those participating or directly impacted, these changes do not have the *scale, relevance or impact* required to *bring about a change in the actual situation of the conflict* at a strategic level. In this case: these projects/operations/actions - whether training programs, dialogue projects, nonviolent demonstrations, people to people initiatives, or any form or action/activity - may have no lasting/significant/sustainable outcome *relevant* to achieving the desired goal of overcoming/ending occupation and enabling a peaceful transformation of the conflict which meets the needs and interests of all parties involved.

6. Profiles - CPR Network & Department of Peace Operations (DPO)

	Nivel 1	Nivel 1.5	Nivel 2	Nivel 3
Ongoing efforts				
Structures & Actors				
Impact				
Links/ Synergies				
Gaps				
Blockers/ Challenges				
Capacities				
Peacebuilding/ Recommendations				
Action plan/ Milestones				

Peace Profiles is one of the first practical/operational tools in peacebuilding for *strategic reflection* and evaluation, lessons learned, and planning *strategic development* which takes us from looking at *individual* or *sectoral* engagements and begins to map the full spectrum of efforts and engagements to address a conflict. In a Peace Profile, *all* on-going efforts and processes across *all* tracks, the actors carrying them out, their impact, links and synergies between them, gaps, blockers and challenges, and capacities are identified and assessed. When implementing a Peace Profile it is best to carry it out as a *collaborative reflection* and *evaluation* and multi-stakeholder, multi-sector strategic planning process: bringing together actors/agencies/practitioners working at the different tracks to enable systematic and comprehensive analysis while creating opportunities for linking and understanding/evaluating dynamics and shortcomings at different levels. The outputs and outcomes from such a process include: clear identification of gaps and challenges facing peacebuilding and nonviolence efforts, identification of existing capacities and initiatives which organizations/actors at different levels may not be aware of, identification of practical steps/measures which can strengthen and improve peacebuilding efforts and effectiveness, and strengthening of *systemic* and *strategic* peacebuilding and nonviolence efforts.

The left column represents the levels:

- **Track 1:** Top level political, economic, combatant and social decision-makers.
- **Track 1.5:** Quiet, back channel, secret or confidential processes amongst top-level leaders or their representatives. If these are non-binding consultations /discussions/fore where decisions are not taken but participants are empowered to take part by Track 1 leadership it is considered a Track 1.5 process.
- **Track 2:** Social level leadership, organized professionals, NGOs, Media, Teachers, Academics, mid-level religious leaders and political activists/cadres, possibly local authorities and civil service. Those with connections to Track 1 leadership and the grassroots communities and broader population.
- **Track 3:** Communities, grassroots workers, community-based processes, organizations and initiatives.
- **Regional and International:** Neighboring countries, neighboring and international states, possibly also regional and/or international organizations.

PROCESS/STEPS: At each of these tracks, identify:

1. **On-Going Peace/Nonviolence Efforts:** *What is being done?* Map/identify existing and on-going efforts or processes to:

- Address/transform the conflict (Attitudes, Behaviors, Contradictions; Direct, Structural, Cultural Violence)
- Address Key Issues/Root Causes
- Build Personnel & Institutional Capacities for transformation of the conflict, peacebuilding, nonviolence
- Prevent/reduce/stop violence
- Build positive relations and opportunities within and between communities
- Heal from the visible and invisible impacts and effects of the violence on individuals and communities
- Build Positive and Enabling/Empowering relations between the communities/ stakeholders to overcome the conflict/end the occupation

2. **Structures & Actors:** *Who:* which are the structures, actors, institutions *doing/ implementing* these processes/efforts?

- Who is leading/driving these initiatives?
- Which are the implementing agencies?
- Which actors/stakeholders are involved?
- What are the structures in place?

3. **Impact:** What are the impacts these are having on the conflict? Can you identify visible results of on-going effort?

4. **Links/Synergies:** Are there links/synergies between different efforts and initiatives? How do these efforts link together and complement each other? Are there connections, coordination, linking between efforts and initiatives at different levels/tracks and within and between different sectors? Are those implementing the different processes and actions at different levels *aware* of what is being done by others and are there any synergies/links between these processes? What is the relationship-dynamic between efforts at different levels and their

overall impact on the conflict? The *cumulative impact* of peace efforts/processes

can produce an effect that enhances or reinforces the effect of individual initiatives. Is this happening or is there an *absence* or *failure* to generate momentum/cumulative impact?

5. **Gaps:** What are the gaps? What is needed or could be done to improve peacebuilding or contribute to transforming the conflict that is not being undertaken (either from domestic or external actors)? What links and synergies are missing - locally, nationally, regionally, internationally, between actors, sectors, engagements. Which peacebuilding needs - what is needed to enable peacebuilding and transformation of the conflict to take place - are not being addressed?

6. **Blockers/Challenges:** What is blocking transformation and peacemaking/nonviolent efforts? What major challenges and difficulties are being experienced? What blockers and challenges can be expected/foreseen? What pillars are sustaining the conflict and keeping it in place, preventing peacebuilding efforts and efforts to overcome/end the occupation and violence/war?

7. **Capacities:** What resources and capacities exist within the societies, actors and stakeholders involved for overcoming these gaps, blockers and challenges and contributing to transforming the conflict? These can include: human, cultural, social, economic, historical, psychological, traditional, values and principles, relationship and other capacities and capabilities at the local, national, regional and international levels.

8. **Peace-building recommendations:** Given 1-7, identify *strategic peacebuilding recommendations*: practical recommendations and strategies for *how* to strengthen/enable/improve peacebuilding and nonviolence efforts and bring about effective change in the conflict/situation.

9. **Action Plan & Milestones:** How will you achieve this? What is necessary to implement these recommendations? What capacities need to be developed, resources deployed, efforts coordinated, steps taken?

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The Department of Peace Operations provides expert support for the development, design and implementation of mediation and peace processes with experience working across Latin America, Africa, Asia and Europe in cooperation with national governments, UN agencies, and international, national and local organisations. A capable and experienced team and global roster of experts and practitioners provides key support for violence prevention, peacebuilding, mediation, and post-war recovery through strengthening capacities and infrastructures for peace operations. The DPO has five operational programs: (1) Mediation, Peace Making and Peace Process Support, (2) Process Implementation and Design, (3) Mentoring, (4) Capacity Building, (5) Consultations & Consultancies. The DPO provides a wide-range of professional consultancies with key expertise in the areas of designing and evaluating peacebuilding programs and processes, mediation, gender and peacebuilding, conflict mapping and analysis, engagement strategies, confidence and security building measures, comparative lessons-learned and best practices, institutional development and organizational strengthening, and program assessments.