The Gaza war has set off a number of acrimonious and polarized debates. One of the most consequential ones for policymaking in the Middle East and internationally has focused on the fate and governance of Gaza and its population.
Earlier discussions tended to be based on a “day after,” in which fighting would stop, Israel would withdraw, humanitarian conditions would improve, displaced families would return, and local governance structures would be devised or repaired. But key actors—Palestinian, Israeli, regional, and global—have staked out very different, often antagonistic positions on critical questions.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Program has asked a group of experts to present how the issues look from various perspectives. We invited them to focus not simply on what they think are ideal answers but on what answers they think are emerging or likely to emerge.
In this first group of short essays, we present analyses of likely Israeli responses. In the following weeks, we will continue to publish pieces tackling Palestinian, regional, and international responses.
—Amr Hamzawy and Nathan J. Brown
Governing Gaza After the War: The Israeli Perspectives
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
By Arie M. Dubnov
Of all forms of human error, prophecy is the most avoidable. As a historian, I typically refrain from peering beyond the annals of the past into the intricate tapestry of the present and the alarming unknowns of the future. Yet, while taking the risk of being gratuitously wrong, I can see three major vectors or possible courses of action for Israel in the post–October 7 era.
A first conceivable scenario would be “more of the same”: continuation of a war in the Gaza Strip, albeit at a diminished intensity, dragging on for an extended period. This trajectory appears to align with the current Israeli government’s preferences, helping it solidify its grip on power. A clear hint was given at the onset of the war when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed the Israeli public, calling for preparedness for a second War of Independence, the first of which lasted for more than a year. Military experts envision an extended phase during which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdraw their ground troops from the strip, engage in a series of brief raids or weeklong campaigns, and retreat each time back into Israeli territory. In this scenario, the level of bloodshed may diminish compared to the past months, the Israeli economy can endure the protracted war effort, and global attention may shift to other arenas.
But this scenario carries deep risks. The conflict’s duration might surpass this time frame and turn into a protracted war of attrition, resembling the eighteen-year Israeli presence in the security strip in southern Lebanon or the Soviet engagement in Afghanistan. And this could raise the possibility of other disasters. Indeed, the specter of genocidal atrocities and ethnic cleansing looms. The substantial arming of Israeli civilians, including many West Bank settlers, could result in forced expulsions of Palestinians and an increased pace of land expropriation in the West Bank’s Area C and beyond. This aligns well with the alt-right’s so-called Decisive Plan. While everyone’s attention would remain fixated on Gaza, where the primary efforts of the regular army would continue to be concentrated, local settlement guards or militias functioning as irregular or semiregular units, akin to paramilitaries, could turn the West Bank into hell on Earth.
Historical precedents abound: paramilitary groups of this kind take orders from local commanders or charismatic political figures and are loyal only to them, not directly beholden to the central authority. Such partisan groups operate independently, with minimal external scrutiny, and are more likely to commit war crimes and target civilian populations. In parallel, the ongoing physical devastation in Gaza and the dismantling of all civil infrastructure will be exacerbated by the encouragement of refugee immigration and resettlement—a move likely to be rationalized as a humanitarian endeavor.
A second and even more frightening scenario is the spillover into a regional war. Raising concerns about a potential escalation of the conflict into a larger Middle Eastern war is understandable, given the numerous current flashpoints in the area. These include the Israel-Lebanon border, a current site of low-intensity war, and the Red Sea, where a wave of missile and drone strikes by the Houthi rebels on commercial ships has caused major interruptions to world trade. Recent bombings by the Islamic State in Iran, the killing of an Iran-backed militia leader in Iraq, and constant instability in Syria add to the concern. Such deterioration could begin following a flare-up on the Israel-Hezbollah front, a Houthi maritime blockade in the Red Sea that would increase shipping costs globally and could push other countries that are heavily reliant on the Suez Canal to intervene, or the failure of diplomatic efforts to de-escalate tension in the region.
The third scenario involves a change of leadership in Israel following domestic protest combined with international pressure. On the eve of October 7, the deeply divided Israeli society was in turmoil, if not on the brink of civil war. Domestic politics will neither dictate nor determine foreign and security policy. However, in the past, protests by reservists who returned from the front—such as those that Israel witnessed after the 1973 War and following the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre—have had considerable political weight. The release of about a quarter-million reservists in the coming weeks may create such a mass movement, especially as many were already active in the massive protest movement before October.
There is little room for wishful thinking here. The likelihood of a left-wing government materializing due to such protests appears scant. Far more probable is that Israelis will be drawn to a hawkish leader exemplifying strength and authority, typically a retired general with a distinguished military career, with a capacity to assume responsibility and navigate intra-Jewish divides.
Could this last scenario, should it unfold, revive hopes of a political settlement? In such a constellation, the prospect of Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti’s release from prison would not be a pipe dream, especially if accompanied by a deal to release all remaining Israeli hostages and prisoners of war captured by Hamas. A gradual restoration of the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the eyes of both center-left Israelis and Palestinians is possible as well. The challenge for all sides to the conflict would be to involve the PA in the restoration of Gaza. Palestinians will have to weigh in on this matter themselves, rather than allowing third parties to decide for them. It is doubtful that a Fatah-led Palestinian leadership will want to take responsibility in the Gaza Strip immediately—not only due to traumatic memories of its bitterly violent struggle with Hamas in June 2007 but also because it will lose its legitimacy instantly if it is seen as a puppet regime rolling back into Gaza on Israeli tanks. Therefore, UN interference is necessary, and it should take the shape of an interim, multinational peacekeeping force similar to the one that was tasked to facilitate the transition to an independent East Timor in 1999 or the NATO-led force deployed to Kosovo in the same year. In the second phase, building and empowering Palestinian security forces in the West Bank is crucial for the future of security in Gaza.
Unfortunately, the three scenarios range between bad and worse. Let us hope the lesser evil will prevail.
Arie M. Dubnov holds the Max Ticktin Chair of Israel Studies and teaches at the Department of History at George Washington University.
Governing Gaza After the War: Palestinian Debates
HOW WILL GAZAN SOCIETY EMERGE FROM THE WAR?
By Mkhaimar Abusada
Gazan society was already suffering from dire economic and social conditions before the outbreak of the current war. Poverty and unemployment had reached unprecedented levels as a result of seventeen years of Israeli siege that turned the Gaza Strip into the largest open-air prison in the world. According to a 2012 UN report, Gaza would be inhospitable by 2020 if the siege were not lifted completely. Since the start of the current war, Gazan society has gone from bad to worse on all levels.
The Israeli bombardment of Gaza since October has led to roughly 93,000 people being declared dead, injured, or missing—4 percent of the territory’s people, according to local authorities. In addition, Israel has destroyed significant parts of Gazan homes and infrastructure in the north, and military operations are underway in the central refugee camps and the southern city of Khan Yunis. EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell has compared the destruction in Gaza with that suffered by German cities during World War II.
Many international agencies have estimated that Gaza needs roughly $50 billion to be rebuilt, and it could take seven to ten years even if the money is available. But this reconstruction will not start until there is a permanent ceasefire and the horrors of this destructive war come to an end.
Some effects of the war will be beyond repair, with the lives of Gaza’s roughly 2 million people having been shattered. Their homes, families, friends, and memories are gone. Gazan society is filled with pain, deprivation, and agony. If that is not dealt with, a more desperate and radical society will emerge.
And the worst has not yet come. The ongoing state of war, chaos, and hunger has motivated local gangs and starving locals to break into and loot vacant homes and exchange any belongings they find for food. There is no active police force; law and order are absent; and local gangs are filling the vacuum in the north of Gaza, where the Israeli army has cleared the area of Hamas fighters. A suggested Israeli plan to place responsibility for people’s lives in the hands of clans and families is a recipe for ongoing internal strife.
Gazan society witnessed similar lawlessness between the start of the First Intifada in December 1987 and the 1993 signing of the Oslo I Accord, which led to the 1994 creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA), as well as during the Second Intifada that began in 2000. Thousands of Palestinian lives were lost during those chaotic years.
The current war is not only weakening Hamas and undermining its rule in Gaza, but also undermining the ability of the PA, political factions, or social forces to safeguard life and property. Israel is sowing chaos in Gaza, and redeploying the Israeli military at the end of the war to newly created buffer zones will lead to a vacuum that will be filled by local gangs and clans, which will primarily preserve and serve themselves.
Israel’s declared approach is to continue the war against Hamas until the group is destroyed—or at least structurally weakened and removed from power. Israel wants to prevent another catastrophe similar to that of October 7. But this approach does not take into consideration the well-being of Gazans. To prevent a state of all-out war, there must be a smooth transition with some contribution from the PA. The PA still has some human resources in Gaza and has been paying them since June 2007, when Hamas seized control of the territory.
Gaza’s needs are not simply those of long-term reconstruction. The lives of Gazans will have to be reassembled and reorganized quickly in the postwar era. It is not only law and order that need to be revived: schools must function again and smoothly, healthcare services must be provided to all, and cleaning and sanitation must resume quickly. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, which has been serving the Palestinian community since 1949, must be empowered to deal with Gaza’s postwar situation. Instead, its own services have been undermined by the United States and many Western governments’ aid suspension.
Neither clans and families nor civil society organizations are capable of carrying out these duties. Therefore, a newly restructured, reformed, and democratic PA must take up its responsibilities; otherwise, not only will Gazan society suffer and pay the price for many years to come, but Gaza’s neighbors of Israel and Egypt will also be unable to escape the volatile political, social, and radical environment that is in the making.
Mkhaimar Abusada is an associate professor of political science at Al-Azhar University—Gaza. He is now based in Cairo.
Governing Gaza After the War: The Regional Perspectives
JORDAN
By Marwan Muasher
The war in Gaza has been raging for more than four months now, resulting not only in tens of thousands of Gazans killed but also in making Gaza practically uninhabitable. Public opinion in Jordan is boiling, and the official reaction has been unprecedented in its criticism of Israel. The government has gone as far as to support South Africa’s submission to the International Court of Justice, which accuses Israel of committing war crimes.
Jordan has refrained from publicly outlining any specific plan for the future of diplomacy with regard to Palestine following the war, preferring to focus its efforts on ending the war on Gaza first. But one can infer what Amman’s priorities are, based on public statements and private discussions with international political visitors to the country.
Jordan understands that a return to the status quo ante isn’t possible and would like the international community to launch a serious political process with a defined end game within a specified time frame. It also will have to reevaluate its relationship with Israel, which was based on co-option and appeasement before October 7. The continuation of such a policy is unlikely, particularly given the strong public anger toward Israel. The absence of a serious political process to end the war and bring peace between Israelis and Palestinians would hinder any future political or economic rapprochement, although the security relationship is unlikely to be seriously affected.
In addition, Jordan still prefers dealing with the Palestinian Authority (PA) rather than with Hamas. Given Hamas’s surging popularity and the PA’s almost total lack of credibility with Palestinians, according to a recent poll, it is not clear yet whether Jordan will decide to expand its network beyond the PA or participate in efforts to produce a revitalized PA without having Palestinian elections, which seem nearly impossible to conduct in the short term. Maintaining the same relationship with the PA, to the exclusion of talking to all other Palestinian forces, will be difficult to justify and would be seen as out of touch with reality.
Jordan’s main priority remains to prevent a mass transfer of Palestinians from Gaza to Egypt and from the West Bank to Jordan. To that effect, Jordan has repeatedly sent humanitarian aid to Gazans and has maintained close coordination with Egypt. Jordan’s leaders want to make sure that the Egyptian stance remains firm, so as not to set a precedent that Israel can use to try to affect a similar future mass transfer of Palestinians into Jordan, particularly given settler violence in Area C of the West Bank. It has succeeded in drawing the attention of the international community, including the United States, to this issue.
Jordan wants the so-called day after to focus on a political initiative to solve the whole conflict—by treating Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem as one and by ending the occupation—rather than just focusing on who rules Gaza after the war.
Marwan Muasher is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he oversees research in Washington and Beirut on the Middle East.
